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Colombia's history is replete with acts of political violence. Guerrilla violence has 
been of major historical significance in the country, where guerrilla groups have operated 
without interruption since the mid-1940s. This thesis investigates the causes and 
consequences of guerrilla violence in Colombia. The research begins with an 
examination of the country's political history, in which the constant oscillation between 
two traditional parties and their ideologies has often resulted in violent conflict. There is 
also a discussion of the various stakeholders in guerrilla violence; from the guerrilla 
groups and political parties, to the Catholic Church, to various economic and social 
groups, each has had its own motivations and methods in reacting to and/or encouraging 
the phenomenon of violence for political ends. Due to the recent shift of focus by some 
guerrilla elements from political to economic objectives, an analysis of the economic 
causes and consequences of guerrilla violence is also undertaken. Finally, there is a 
review of the constitutional refonn process that has led to an opportunity for the country 
to resolve political issues through non-violent means. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pedro A-1tvu.io Marin Marin was born on May 12, 1928. The member of a Liberal 
Party peasant family in the area of Quindio, he lived the violent period of the late 1940s 
as an adolescent. By 1949, the Liberal group to which he belonged had joined forces 
with communist guerrillas, and he had adopted the name of Manuel Marulanda Velez, 
known as Tirofijo ("Sure-Shot") to his comrades. By the 1960s he had become the 
nation-wide leader of one of the largest and long-lived guerrilla movements in Latin 
American history. 
His life in many ways parallels that of modem Colombia. A nation that has dealt 
with political violence continuously since the late J 940s, Colombia has only recently 
been able to consider the possibility of a generation that has not been exposed to the level 
and scope of brutality that so often characterizes political violence. 
The history of political violence in Colombia has a cast of many stakeholders, 
among them the politician, the guerrilla, the partisan, the soldier, the church, the worker, 
the peasant, the industrialist, the activist, and the bandit. General violence is today stiJJ 
present in everyday Colombian life. Kidnappings, extortion, and murder have all reached 
a terrible magnitude, and placed present-day Colombia among the most violent nations of 
the world. It in part because of the population's firm desire to reduce overall violence in 
Colombian society that political violence has become a target of government and 
institutional efforts. 
In 1991, the Colombian people adopted a new constitution. One of the principle 
motivations of the new constitutions supporters was the desire to put a permanent end to 
the political violence that had characterized so much of the nation's history. In 1994, the 
national dialog and reconciliation that began, and was subsequently stimulated by 
constitutional reform, has reached a point where it is possible to objectively review its 
history: the causes and consequences of guerrilla violence can be examined in a Jess 
passionate way. This constitutional reform takes place in a world arena that is marked by 
both the fall of communism and a trend toward economic modernization. This is of 
special significance in Latin America, long known for its economic problems and 
insurgent movements. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the history of political vjolence in 
Colombia from the varying perspectives of its stakeholders to derive an understanding of 
how the dialog and reconciliation has come to take place. An addi!ional goal is to define 
view of the economic considerations at work in this process. The research and analysis 
that is performed are used to inform the conclusions and recommendations that wilJ be 
offered in the final chapter regarding the past and future of political violence in 
Colombia. The principal research question of the current work is, therefore: What are 
the causes and consequences of guerriJJa violence in Colombia? 
2 
Chapter II is a brief survey of the political life of Colombia ftom the War of a 
Thousand Days at the tum of the century to the post-National Front period, which 
continues to the present. The chapter is meant to highlight key events that were marked 
by, or intimately involved with, political violence. The chapter necessarily includes 
reference to the various leaders that have been influential in Colombian history, but there 
is no exhaustive profile of any individual or regime. 
Chapter III is concerned with identifying the stakeholders in political violence. The 
various guerrilla groups that have been prominent in Colombian political violence are 
briefly profiled. The identification of stakeholders continues with discussion of the 
traditional political parties and their internal factions, the military, industry, the Catholic 
Church, labor, the rural population, various civic movements, and bandits and narcotics 
traffickers. The putpose of the discussion is not to clarify responsibility for one action or 
another, but rather to view political violence, or the guerrillas who petpetrate it, from the 
perspective of each stakeholder. This will allow the reader to gain an understanding of 
each stakeholder's influence in bringing about the period of national dialog and 
reconciliation, and will provide dimension to the theoretical and economic discussion of 
Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV presents an economic perspective on political violence in Colombia. 
The chapter opens with a discussion of theoretical political competition. Subsequent 
sections relate current indicators of the economy, examine the finance methods of 
guerrilla groups, and estimate the economic consequences of political violence. 
3 
Chapter V discusses the period of national dialog and reconciliation that has 
emerged in the early 1990s. The efforts at refonn that lie within the Constitution of 1991 
are mentioned, as are ongoing military, political, and economic policies. 
Chapter VI presents conclusions about the causes and consequences of guerrilla 
violence in Colombia, which are infonned by the research described in the previous 
chapters. Additionally, recommendations are offered as to how the momentum of dialog 
and national reconciliation can be maintained. 
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II. THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
To understand the origins of violence in Colombia, it is necessary to review the 
political events and trends that mark the history of the country. This is because, since 
independence in 1819, the search for political order has been an obsession in Colombia. 
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the central state was still fragile. The 
unification of the national market, and even the political system, was far from being a 
reality. None of the urban poles were imposing a true supremacy. The larger financial 
and commercial elites, although progressing in modernization, could not avoid conflict 
with local elites, who, because of the recent rise of an export economy, had time to ensure 
political power through a monopoly of the land. The system was so complex that, to 
many, political renewal seemed to be possible only through violent means. 
Elite members of the Liberal Party (LP) and the Conservative Party (CP), 1 
alternately competed and cooperated with each other throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Often the nature of relations between the two parties depended on 
whether moderates or extremists dominated the ruling party. During periods when 
moderate factions of both parties were in power, the parties were able to work together in 
coalitions; when extremists factions prevailed, however, conflict often resulted. During 
competitive periods, one party usually sought to limit or eliminate the rival party's 
The traditional Colombian parties, that even today receive more than 80% of the electoral 
vote. 
5 
participation in the political process, and these attempts often resulted in political 
violence. 
In the early 1860s, after a civil war, the Liberals emerged victorious, and held 
power until 1884. A Constitution was enacted in 1863, but parties continued to engage in 
local conflicts. In 1884, the Conservative Rafael Nuiiez was elected President, resulting 
in a dramatic reversal of prior government policies. In 1886 a new constitution was 
adopted, which remained in force until 1991. This constitution had a defined purpose of 
integrating Colombia under a centralized political authority, representing a victory for 
the Conservative leadership, as well as traditionalists and Catholics. 
The last civil war, the War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902), took more than 
I 00,000 lives, ruined the capacity for production, and allowed the separation of Panama 
by focusing the government on internal, rather than external, considerations.2 At the end 
of this conflict, the elite inaugurated a Period of Reconciliation (1903-30), catalyzed by 
Rafael Reyes' presidency. The replacement of discredited extremist factions with a more 
conciliatory moderate faction made it possible for the two parties to share power and 
achieve a consensus on what policies were appropriate for Colombian society. 
Liberal merchants and Conservative agriculturists found a common interest in 
coffee exports, which were quickly beginning to dominate the Colombian economy. 
Their mutual economic interests allowed the moderate factions of each party to join in a 
bipartisan coalition that gained political control at the end of the civil war. Although the 
~ ~- ~~ -~~-~------· ·-~·-- ~~ ·-~ ~~~ ---
Sturges. Karen, "Historical Setting of Colombia", in Colombia: A Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed .• Washington, 1990, p. 26. 
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Conservatives retained nominal control of political institutions until 1930, they accepted 
and applied the principle of minority representation and participation in government. 
Conservative presidents appointed Li~!5 !o their bipartisan cabinets, thus including 
tth .. :n in political decision making. Although party conflict and rural unrest remained, the 
coalitions that the two parties formed provided a basis for political stability. 
In the early 1900s, the industrial sector became an increasingly important part of 
the economy. Between 1900 and 1910, textile industries developed in Antioquia, pottery 
plants in Caldas, and breweries in Cundinamarca and Antioquia (See Figure 1 ). During 
the 191 Os and 1920s, the Colombian economy became more integrated in the global 
financial and commercial markets. The United States replaced Britain as Colombia's key 
financial and commercial partner. Most of the foreign exchange came from the coffee 
trade, which at this time represented nearly 80 percent of exports. By 1929, private 
foreign investment totaled US $400 million, with some US $45 million having been 
invested by oil companies. 3 
The growth in industry and construction led to the emergence of a genuine working 
class that soon learned to unionize. In 1918 Colombia experienced its first major strike, 
on the Atlantic coast. North American investments were affected by strikes in 1924 and 
1927 in the Tropical Oil Company, and in 1928 a strike against the United Fruit 
Company was violently put down by the Anned Forces. There was also tension in the 
rural areas, especially where the big coffee "haciendas" were located. Growing popular 
----- -··-···-
Sturges, Karen, "Historical Setting of Colombia", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 31. 
7 
discontent with Conservative governments, and divisions within Conservative ranks, 





























Figure 1. Map of Colombia Showing Departments. 
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The Liberals, recognizing the social changes that were under way, identified 
themselves with the growing demands of the masses. After fifty years of Conservative 
rule, the Liberals gained the upper hand in the political arena and retained it during 
fifteen years ( 1930-45) of global crisis. 
A. THE REFORMIST PERIOD (1930-1938) 
As a result o£ the Liberal victory in 1930, many of the privileges that had been 
afforded to Conservatives through patronage politics were now denied. Because the 
President appointed the governors, who in turn appointed the municipal mayors, the 
transfer of power from the CP to the LP at the presidential level was felt at the municipal 
level. Because of the change in the political affiliation of the police force, the stricter 
application of the law was transferred to members of the opposition party. Clashes 
resulted between partisan groups among the lower classes, who sough either to gain or to 
maintain their privileges. 
The first Liberal president of the twentieth century, Enrique Olaya Herrera 
(1930-34), was a member of a prestigious family, and former ambassador to the United 
States, where he established close relations with business organizations. His election 
coincided with a drop in the price of coffee to about one-third of its 1928 price. Loans 
from United States banks stopped, and international reserves dropped from US $73 
Million in 1929 to US $17 million at the end of 1931.4 The country along with most of 
127. 
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the world, was gripped by an economic depression. Olaya succeeded in carrying out 
some refonns, especially in education. Nonetheless, some Liberals, disappointed by their 
party's failure to carry out a "revolution," created in 1932 a movement called the 
Revolutionary Leftist National Union (Union Nacional lzquierdista Revolucionario--
UNIR). The movement came to an end after Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, its leader, returned to 
the LP in 1935 after the party adopted many of his proposed reforms and offered him a 
congressional seat. 
In 1934 Alfonso LOpez Pumarejo became elected as Olaya's successor to the 
presidency. LOpez Pumarejo was born in an oligarchic finance family founded at the end 
of the 19'h century. With the slogan "Revolution on the March", LOpez announced the 
end of the oligarchic era and the arrival of a modem burgess society with links between 
the people and the State. Believing that the reformist faction of the LP had become 
strong enough to carry out its program, the Lopez Pumarejo administration implemented 
extensive reforms, principally in agriculture, education and the system of taxation. These 
reforms included constitutional amendments that guaranteed the state's role in developing 
the economy of the country and diversifying its exports, authorized the national 
government to expropriate property for the common good, provided special state 
protection for labor and the right for labor unions to strike, and stipulated that public 
assistance was a function of the state. Additional reforms included the strict enforcement 
of progressive income and inheritance taxes, the guarantee of rights granted to squatters 
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on public and private lands, the reinforcement of credit institutions, and the renewed 
separation of church and state. 5 
The reforms put in place by the LOpez Pumarejo administration, combined with 
import substitution policies, helped to accelerate the capitalist development of Colombia. 
During thi~ administration, coffee prices and the volume of exports increased. A surge in 
industrialization began in 1930s, aided by various external and internal factors. The key 
external factor was the world economic crisis of the 1930s, which limited the availability 
of goods to be imported and limited market for exports. Internal factors included 
domestic capital accumulation; increased buying power of large groups, especially coffee 
growers; the construction of communication and transportation facilities that unified the 
internal market; and a continuation of protectionist policies begun by President Reyes in 
1904. The increasing emphasis on growing and exporting coffee fostered industrial 
development and allowed a more equitable distribution of income because more skilled 
laborers were employed and received higher wages. 
Once the illusions of the "Revolution in March" dissipated, the people realized that 
there was little advance in refonn. The resistance of the elites, separation within the 
Liberal Party, the revival of the Conservative fundamentalism, and the weakness of the 
public popular sectors are all in part responsible for this deterioration. However, Liberal 
refonn had contributed to the legitimization of democratic politics. In contrast, the 
5 Sturges, Karen, "Historical Setting of Colombia", in Colombia: A Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 33. 
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Conservatives favored a minimum of refonn, the greatest possible influence of the 
church, and continued control of the country by a small upper class. 
B. STATE REGULATIONS AND SOCIAL DEREGULATION (1938-1945) 
In 1938, disagreement over the extent to which Liberal ideology should be applied 
led to a split between the pro-refonn supporters of LOpez Pumarejo and the pro-status 
-quo followers of fellow Liberal Eduardo Santos, owner of the national daily "El 
Tiempo". In that year, Santos became president wi~ the support of moderate Liberals 
and Conservatives opposed to LOpez Pumarejo's Revolution on the March. 
Santos's victory was certainly the continuation of the "Liberal Republic"; but also 
meant rupturing LOpez's social agreement. This was not a renunciation of interventionist 
ideology, but rather an imposition of social discipline on popular organizations that had 
lost their identification with the regimen; it was a situation in which the state took priority 
over the social classes. 
Santos retained some of his predecessor's policies, such as protectionism, and 
oriented his administration toward capitalist industrial and agricultural development. The 
Santos administration improved the economic capability of the country to invest in 
industry. It also stimulated capital intensive agriculture to convert traditionallatifundios 
(large land-holdings), which relied on cheap labor, into capitalist haciendas, which used 
advanced technology. The reduced demand for manual labor in the countryside caused 
many campesinos (country worker) to migrate to the cities. His administration also 
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strengthened economic, commercial, and cultural relations with the United States. 
During World War II, be cooperated with the Unites States in the defense of the Panama 
Canal, and broke relations with the Axis governments. 6 
Despite opposition from Conservatives, moderate Liberals, and a more progressive 
Liberal group led by Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, LOpez Pumarejo was elected to a second tenn 
in 1942. Paradoxically, Alfonso LOpez Pumarejo became the man with the responsibility 
of dismantling the interventionist apparatus and formalizing the poli~ical connection to a 
more liberal development model. In his first term, that interventionism helped the 
interests of industrialists; but in the second tenn, the same industrialists contended that 
those social refonns and policies were no longer appropriate, and resisted new reforms. 
This is why he was not as successful in his second term in implementing reform. The 
Conservative Laureano Gomez exploited the Liberal division by attacking Lopez 
Pumarejo's foreign policy, including the declaration of war on the Axis powers in 1943. 
Other effects of War World II were being felt at that time, including an unbalanced 
budget, unstable foreign trade, a decline in coffee prices, and an increase in import prices. 
Discontent with Lopez increased. In 1944, Laureano Gomez made personal attacks 
on Lopez that were so inflammatory that Gomez was imprisoned. This triggered 
demonstrations and street fighting in Bogota. Lopez provisionally abandoned the 
presidency in favor of his substitute Dario Echandia from September J 943 to May 1944. 
In July 1944, during army maneuvers, Lopez Pumarejo and some of his cabinet members 
b Sturges, Karen, "Historical Setting of Colombia", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 35. 
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were held prisoner for a few days by officers staging an abortive military coup in Pasto. 
Although most of the military supported constitutional order, LOpez Pumarejo lost 
prestige and power. In July 1945, he resigned in favor of his first presidential designate, 
Alberto Lleras Camargo, a Liberal who had distinguish himself as a writer and 
government official. 
Lleras Camargo, who served as provisional president until August 1946, appointed 
representatives of all parties to his cabinet in an effort to establish a "national union." 
Nonetheless, his coalition policy was attacked by Gaitan, who had gained considerable 
support among the masses and among some intellectuals and industrialists. 
When World War II was finished, the social elites were ready to take on the Liberal 
model of development. However, there was a difficulty: the state was too weak to face 
the "social problem." The misery of the rural masses, their progressive displacement to 
the cities, and the inability of industry to assimilate them, were problems that worried the 
socio-economic elite about the future of the social order. Two contradictory formulations 
appeared: The first, from Laureano Gomez, placed the division of the society in a 
political frame. The second, from jorge Eliecer Gaitan was located in the social frame, 
and considered that the state should no longer be a source of support for the masses. 7 
Pecaut. Daniel. Orden y Violencia: Colombia 1930-1954, Siglo veintiuno Editores, 19Bi p. 
353. 
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C. THE APOGEE OF POPULISM (1946-1948) 
When Gabriel Turbay, a moderate Liberal, won the party's nomination for the 1946 
presidential election, Gaitan decided to run independently, and his forces shifted to a 
more militant stance. In the elections, the number of votes obtained by Gaitan were 44 
percent of the liberal votes, 8 even though he was not officially supported by his party. 
His invitation to the people to join against the oligarchy of both parties worried the 
established party leaders.9 This serious split among Liberals resulted in the election of 
the Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Perez, by a plurality of 42 percent of the 
electorate. 
The transfer of power in 1946 ignited tensions between the two parties, resulting in 
violent political conflict, particularly in rural areas. Ospina assumed office, and was 
faced with the difficult task of ruling from a minority position, as Liberals had received 
the majority of all presidential votes and continued to control the Congress. Ospina tried 
to resolve this situation by incorporating Liberals into a coalition government. 
Meanwhile the level of political rivalry intensified in the countryside, where 
Conservatives pursued a course of violence and repression in an attempt to consolidate 
power after sixte~n years out of office. Liberals retaliated and, under Gaitan's leadership, 
became highly mobilized around the demand that the Ospina government confront the 
social needs of the modernizing and urbanizing nation. 




Gaitanism, the populist social movement led by Gaitan as faction of the LP, 
increased dramatically between 1946 and 1948. Gaitan supported the democratic, rather 
than the revolutionary, path to reforms. By advocating the passage of more socially 
liberal policies, he appealed to the masses and he united urban workers and campesinos. 
The "worker's class" already had a political identity, generated in 1936 under the support 
of Alfonso Lopez. The movement also used divisions in the Unions and the Communist 
party to obtain more followers. As the movement grew, observers believed that Gaitan 
would be elected president, which may have happened had he lived to see the next 
election. 
Liberal victories in the 1947 congressional elections demonstrated the party's 
strength among the electorate. Ospina became increasingly concerned with retaining 
control, and further provoked Liberals by resorting frequently to police enforcement of 
Conservative privileges in the rural areas. The Liberal appointees in his government 
resigned in protest in March 1948. 
D. "LA VIOLENCIA" (1948-1953) 
On April 9, Gaitan was assassinated at midday in the heart of Bogota. The 
inevitable explosion occurred in the fom1 of the most violent and destructive riot in the 
country's long history of conflict. An angry mob immediately seized and killed the 
assassin. In the ensuing riot, some 2,000 people were killed, and a large portion of 
downtown Bogota was destroyed. The "Bogotazo" as the episode came to be called, was 
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an expression of mass social frustration and grief by a people who had lost the man who 
represented their only potential link to the decision-making process. Due to a lack of 
leadership in the revolt, order was restored in Bogota, and Ospina remained in control. 
The tempo of rural violence quickened from decentralized violence to a state of 
undeclared civil war known as "La Violencia" (the violence). 
The violence didn't begin on April 9; a estimated total of 14,000 victims as of 1947 
due to the rural conflict between the parties, is a proof of its prior existence. 10 However, 
after Gaitan's death, the "law of blood and fire" increased substantially, and the general 
fare war known as "La Violencia" claimed over 200,000 lives during the next eighteen 
years, with the bloodiest period occurring between 1948 and 1958. 11 This phenomenon 
spread throughout the country, especially in the Andes and the Llanos {plains), sparing 
only the southernmost portion of Nariiio and parts of the Caribbean coastal area. 
Extremely complex, the period was characterized by an heterogeneous mixture of 
electoral crashes and blind political rivalry, military actions, local vendettas, individual 
revenges, economic extortion born of organized guerrillas!2 and social banditry. The 
basic cause of this protracted period of internal disorder, however, was the refusal of 
successive governments to accede to the people's demands for social, political and 
economic changes. 
11
' Pecaut, Daniel, Orden y Violencia: Colombia 7 930-1954, Siglo veintiuno Editores, 1987, p. 
487. Information taken by the author from P. Oquist' s Violence, politics, and conflict in Colombia, 
Bogota, Banco Popular, 1976. 
" Ramsey, Russell, Guerril/eros y So/dados, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 1981, p. 287. 
11 Guerrillas groups will be discussed in detail in Chdpter Ill. 
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After the Bogotazo, the Ospina government became more repressive. Liberal 
governors were fired, and the anny forcibly closed the Congress. Rural police forces 
heightened the effort against belligerents and Liberals, and eventually all Liberals, from 
the ministerial to the local level, resigned their posts in protest. In October 1949, 
Laureano Gomez announced his candidacy for the presidency, after having been in 
semi-exile in Spain due to the events of April 9; the Liberals considered this to be a 
declaration of war. On the 28th of Octobe1 !he LP decided not. to participate in the 
presidential elections, and days later presented in the Congress a motion to depose 
Mariano Ospina. His answer was to close the Congress, and impose a state of censorship 
and siege in all the national territory. 
In the 1949 presidential election, Laureano Gomez, the only Conservative 
candidate, took office in 1950. Gomez was firmly in control of the party. As leader of 
the reactionary faction, he preferred authority, hierarchy, and order. Accusing the LP of 
falsifying voter identification, he became contemptuous of universal suffrage and 
majority rule. Gomez acquired broad powers and curtailed civil liberties in an attempt to 
confront the mounting violence and the possibility that the Liberals might regain power. 
Pro-labor laws passed in the 1930s were canceled by executive decree, independent labor 
unions were struck down, congressional elections were held without opposition, the press 
was censored, courts were controlled by the executive, and freedom of worship was 
chaJJenged as mobs attacked Protestant chapels. Gomez directed his repression 
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particularly against the Liberal opposition, which he branded communist. In 1950, at the 
height of violence, the number of deaths reportedly reached 50,000.13 
In the early 1950's, Liberal guerrillas began a process. of rapid organization, and 
established a supply of small weapons. When Gomez took power, 4,500 organized men 
were in formal resistance against the govertunent across the country, although some of 
them were not engaged in combat against military forces. During this first experience 
with guerrilla warfare, the Army increased in size to 15,000, the Navy to 3,20\J (including 
Marines), and the Air Force to 1,200.14 
Despite the relative prosperity of the economy, Gomez lost support because of 
protracted violence and his attacks on moderate Conservatives and the military 
establishment. Because of illness, in November 1951 Gomez allowed his first 
presidential designate, Roberto Urdaneta Arbehiez, to become acting president until 
Gomez was able to reassume the presidency. Although Urdaneta followed Gomez's 
policies, he refuset. to dismiss General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whom Gomez suspected of 
conspiring against the government. When Gomez tried to return to office in June 1953, a 
coalition consisting of moderate Conservatives who supported Ospina, the LP, and the 
Armed Forces deposed him and installed a military government. They viewed this action 
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E. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (1953-1957) 
Initial response to the coup was enthusiastic and widespread; only the elements at 
the two extremes of the political spectrum protested the action. Rojas Pinilla's first goal 
was to end the violence, and to that end be offered amnesty and government aid to those 
belligerents who would lay down their anns. Thousands complied with the offer, and 
there was relative calm for several months after the coup. Other immediate steps taken 
by Rojas Pinilla included the transfer of the National Police to the Armed Forces in an 
effort to depoliticize the police, relaxation of press censorship, and release of political 
prisoners. 
The government also started an extensive senes of public works projects to 
construct transportation networks and hospitals, and improved the system of credit for 
sma]) fanners. The National Social Welfare Service, under the direction of Gomez' 
daughter Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Diaz, was created to meet the most pressing 
needs of the poor, and public works projects began to provide jobs for the masses of 
urban unemployed. The tax system was restructured to place more of the burden on the 
elite. Poorly administered, however, these reform programs met with little success. 
Rojas Pinilla was unable to restructure Colombian society. 15 
Support for the Rojas Pinilla regime faded within its first year. Toward the end of 
1953, rural violence was renewed, and Rojas undertook strict measures to counter it. 
Following a substantial increase in police and military budgets, the government assumed 
'~ Sturges, Karen, "Historical Setting of Colombia", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 40. 
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a dictatorial character. The government reversed its initial reforms and relied instead on 
repression. In addition, economic deterioration, triggered by a drop in coffee prices and 
exacerbated by inflationary government policies, seriously threatened the gains made 
since World War II. Scorched-earth policies were introduced to confront the 20,000 
belligerents estimated to be active in rural areas. 
The old National Constitutional Assembly, created by Laureano Gomez, helped 
Rojas Pinilla in providing a legal facade for his dictatorship. A new constitution (the 
Constitution of i886 had been abolished in 1954) created a Legislative Assembly 
composed of fifty-nine Conservatives and thirty-three Liberals, twenty of whom were 
nominated by Rojas. That assembly confirmed him as a President until 1962, an action 
that consolidated mounting opposition to Rojas Pinilla, and precipitated his subsequent 
fall from power. By early 1957, Liberal and Conservative elites decided to stop feuding 
and to join forces against the president under the banner of the National Front. A final 
agreement was signed in San Carlos in 1957, and provided a basis for power-sharing 
between the parties. The San Carlos Agreement also called for the fQllowing: restoration 
of the Constitution of 1886; the alternation of the presidency between the two parties 
every four years; parity between the parties in all legislative bodies; a required two-thirds 
majority vote for the passage of legislation; the establishment of an administrative career 
service of neutral parties not subject to partisan appointment; women's suffrage and equal 
political rights for women; and the devotion of at least 10 percent of the national budget 
to education. 
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As the party leaders laid the basis for a coalition government, the tides of discontent 
turned against Rojas Pinilla. With the arrest ofGuiJlenno LeOn Valencia, a Conservative 
leader involved in the creation of the National Fron,, Rojas Pinilla was confronted with 
student demonstrations, massive strikes, riots, and finally the declared opposition of the 
church and the defection of top-ranking military officers. In May 1957, faced with a 
multitude of protesters and top military leaders requesting his resignation, Rojas Pinilla 
resigned and went into temporary exile in Spain. Power reverted to a five-man military 
junta led by General Gabriel Paris, who promised the free election of a civilian president 
in August 1958. 
F. THE NATIONAL FRONT (1957-1974) 
In December 1957, Colombians voted overwhelmingly in a national plebiscite to 
approve the agreements that had been reached by the National Front as amendments to 
the Constitution of 1886. As a result of internal divisions within the CP, in August 1958 
Lleras Camargo, a Liberal, was elected as the first president under the National Front. 
When he took office, he faced not only the problems of rivalry between Liberals and 
Conservatives, but also factional controversies within the two parties. He succeeded, 
however, in demonstrating that the National Front program could point the way to a 
restoration of constitutional government. His administration adopted vigorous measures 
to reduce banditry and rural violence. 
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Lleras Camargo introduced an austerity program to improve economic conditions, 
and in 1958 Colombia recorded its most favorable balance of trade in twenty years. A 
Law of Agrarian Reform, passed in 1961 provided for a new agency, the Colombian 
Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA). Lleras Camargo's government made only 
limited progress in land reform, due to opposition from Liberals who denounced the plan 
as inadequate, and from Conservatives who called it communistic and revolutionary. 
Nevertheless, by the end of his term in 1962, Lleras Camargo had d~ne much to stabilize 
the economy, stimulate increased output of industrial and agricultural products, and bring 
the people a renewed confidence in the future. 
Guillermo Leon Valencia became the next official Conservative candidate of the 
National Front, and was elected for the 1962-66 presidential term. Valencia took only 
modest steps to continue the programs initiated by his predecessor. He ignored, for 
example, the National Planning Department, failing to fill vacancies as they occurred. 
INCORA's land reform program also ran into opposition from large landholders. In 
addition, Valencia's finance minister, Carlos Sanz, devaluated the peso and proposed new 
taxes, thereby arousing the hostility of Congress. 
Declining economic conditions contributed to growing social unrest. Inflation 
increased due to a drop in coffee prices and an increase in the printing of money; 
contraband trade with neighboring countries generated drains on the economy; and US 
$64 million in foreign loans had been withheld, and the government was faced with a 
serious deficit. 16 Rumors of plots against the government circulated, students protesting 
16 Ibid, p. 43. 
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high prices rioted in Bogota, and kidnappings occurred frequently. Valencia declared a 
State of Siege in May 1965 and, having lost additional Congressional support, was forced 
to rule by decree. In mid 1965, the government applied other austerity measures. The 
United States and other international lending agencies then agreed to make loans to 
Colombia with the understanding that the government would take vigorous action to 
improve its financial situation. Inflation leveled off, and rumors of plots to remove the 
president died down. 
1. Opposition to the National Front 
Despite the constitutional amendment stipulating that only the LP and CP were 
authorized to participate in elections, groups opposing the National Front arrangement 
formed "movements" to challenge the establishment by presenting candidates under the 
Liberal and Conservative banners. In 1959, Liberal dissidents formed the Liberal 
Revolutionary Movement (MRL) under the leadership of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, son 
of former president LOpez Pumarejo. The most serious challenge to the National Front 
arrangement came from the populist National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), which was 
founded in 1961 by Rojas Pinilla after his return from exile. 
During the mid-1960s, the embers of La Violencia were clearly dying out, but 
Guerrilla activity was emerging. Banditry was now institutionalized, with the help of 
Marxist groups supporting a revolutionary style. In 1964 the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) was formed by students who were disenchanted with the pro-Soviet Communist 
Party of Colombia but were inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The ELN gained greater 
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notoriety when father Camilo Torres Restrepo, a Jesuit priest, joined the guerrilla group 
in 1966 and was killed in an armed conflict with government forces shortly thereafter. In 
1966 another guerrilla movement, the Revolutionary Anned Forces of Colombia 
(F ARC), began operating and was officially designated as a branch of the PCC. 17 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the third president under the National Front, proved to 
be an effective leader. Aided by an especially competent group of cabinet members, 
Lleras Restrepo enacted a number of reforms during his tenure in office. His different 
economic and social reforms drew support from international lending agencies, which 
helped ease the fiscal problems that had beset the Valencia Administration. The policies 
of the Lleras Restrepo administration resulted in an increased rate of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, an explosive population increase continued to add some 200,000 young 
Colombians to the labor force each year, and the problems of poverty and unemployment 
persisted. 18 This administration originated a system of family planning that is still in 
effect, in spite of considerable church opposition. 
Unrest in the late 1960s assumed a more urban and more nearly class-oriented 
base, as rural and inter-party violence receded. Rural disorders declined markedly as a 
consequence of optimism on the economic front and the capture of some of the most 
prominent guerrilla leaders. In 1968, however, a new guerrilla group -- the Popular 
17 Walker, Phyllis, "Colombian National Security", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 268. 
18 Bagley, Bruce, "The Society and its Environment", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washington, 1990, p. 59. 
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Liberation Army (EPL)- was fonned as the anned branch of the Communist Party, with 
a pro-Chinese orientation. 
In December 1968, Lleras Restrepo lifted the stage of siege that had been 
imposed under Valencia in 1965. Sporadic incidents of violence occurred, however, 
especially among dissident students and labor Union members, and the government 
reinstated its emergency powers on several occasions. Dissidence within the LP was 
lessened with the reintegration of the MRL, headed by L6pez Michelsen, who came to 
play a valuable role in the Lleras Restrepo government. In the 1968 congressional 
elections, supporting elements of the National Front gained a strong majority, but voter 
apathy persisted, with less than 40 percent of eligible voters participating. 
Under the banner of ANAPO, Rojas Pinilla continued his appeal to the urban 
masses and the peasantry, promising solutions to the problems of unemployment and 
inflation, and advocating free education and health care for the poor. ANAPO challenged 
the National Front by presenting Rojas Pinilla as a Conservative candidate for the 
presidency in 1970. The election took place in an atmosphere of escalating violence, and 
the public received with widespread skepticism the official announcement that the 
Conservative candidate of the National Front, Misael Pastrana Borrero, had won by a 
narrow margin of 65,000 votes. 19 The outpouring of support for Rojas Pinilla indicated 
significant voter dissatisfaction with the National Front's res-ponse to Colombia's 
persistent social and economic problems. 
----~ -- -~-- ~-- --- -~ --
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2. Dismantling tbe Coalition Apparatus 
Pastrana Borrero was the last president to be elected under the provisions of the 
National Front. The parity provision for elective legislative bodies and the exclusion of 
nontraditional parties from participation in elections were eliminated on the local level. 
Pastrana termed his administration the "Social Front" and followed most of the policies of 
his predecessor. In two areas of economic policy, however, he differed: land reform and 
the status of the construction sector. Land reform included promises of redistribution. 
This effort failed to influence due to the interests of landowners, but an effort was made 
to modernize the sector. In industrial policy, Pastrana chose construction as the leading 
sector and engine of growth for the economy. Private investment was encouraged 
through the establishment of the Units of Constant Purchasing Power (UP AC), a system 
by which investment not only accrued interest but also was adjusted for inflation. The 
combination of the UPAC system and huge investment in construction over stimulated 
the economy and fueled inflation, which reached 27 percent by 1974. 
Guerrilla activity continued during the Pastrana Administration. In 1972, yet 
another guerrilla group the 19th of April Movement (M-19) --emerged. The M-19 took 
its name from the date on which Rojas Pinilla was narrowly and, in their minds. 
fraudulently, defeated by Pastrana. Although the M-19 claimed to be the armed branch of 
ANAPO, the Rojas Pinilla organization disavowed any connection to the group. 
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G. THE POST-NATIONAL FRONT PERIOD 
The LP and the CP were weak, divided into factions, and inadequately organized at 
the end of the existence of the National Front in 1974. Because the political parties were 
not eager to engage in intense competition, Colombia achieved a peaceful transition to an 
open system. The principle of power sharing was retained, although a president was 
aJJowed to select appointees from whatever sources he chose if the opposition refused to 
participate in his government. 
The experience of the National Front, the lack of organizational efforts by the 
parties, and massive migrations from rural to urban areas weakened party affiliations, 
which also decreased the likelihood of i;Jter-party violence. The period after the National 
Front also reflected a growing gap between the issues and agendas of the political elite 
and the demands, concerns, and expectations of the populace. Political apathy and 
cynicism among the people increased. Thus, Colombia experienced a radicalization of 
peasant movements, an increase in urban protests, a growing restlessness within the urban 
labor movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla activity. 
Popular discontent with the government's management of the economy continued 
despite steaJy economic growth and high primary export revenues. The massive 
underground e~onomy, fueled by drug trafficking, undermined the government's efforts to 
control inflatiC"'t:, and contributed to the rise of a parallel financial market, placing a large 
part of the national economy beyond the control of legitimate authority.20 
20 Hornbeck, j.F, "The Economy", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, Dennis, ed., 
Washington, 1990, p. 141. 
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H. SUMMARY 
Colombia's political landscape was characterized by constant oscillation between 
the traditional parties. At various times, for varying reasons, and with variable levels of 
justification, the political confrontations between these two parties, and some of their 
internal factions, degenerated into violent coilflict. 
The conflicting and often violent nature of Colombian political life formed the 
political environment in which the modem development of the country has taken place. 
How this political competition is related to the various demands of stakeholders in 
political violence is discussed in the following chapter. 
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ID. STAKEHOLDERSININSURGENCY 
A. THE GUERRILLAS 
Modem political violence in Colombia began as a product of the civil war known 
as "La Violencia. " The frequency and scale of attacks and counterattacks between 
supporters of both political parties increased after the congressional elections of 1947, 
and becoming even more vicious after the 1949 presidential election. 
By 1950, Liberal guerrilla squads were operating in the Llanos (plains east of the 
Andes) and elsewhere to retaliate against Conservative farms and villages. It is estimated 
that 20,000 people bore arms in the Liberal guerrilla groups between 1949 and 1953. 21 1n 
some areas, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) attempted to organize these Liberal 
groups, as well as its own members, for guerrilla warfare, thus bringing an ideological 
dimension to the political violence of the period. Conservatives also organized armed 
groups to defend against Liberal attacks, or, in many cases, simply to attack Liberals. In 
Aug>.ist 1952, in the municipality of Viota (Cundinamarca), the first national conference 
of "Popular National Liberation Movements" took place. Among those attending was 
Manuel Marulanda Velez, one of the first founders of a formal Colombian guerrilla 
movement. 
2! Maullin, Richard, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, Rand Corporation, 1973, p. 
6. 
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In those years, the commanders of both the communist and Liberal guerrilla groups, 
who were fighting in the central Andes against the conservative establishment, agreed to 
unify their forces. They established in southern Tolima what became known as the 
Comando de El Davis (the Davis Command). 22 Due to ideological differences, soon the 
Liberal guerrillas, referred to as "clean Liberals", not only separated from but actual1y 
entered into combat with the communist guerril1as, referred to as "common Liberals." 
When General Rojas Pinilla came to power, many of these Liberal and Conservative 
irregulars retired, taking advantage of amnesties offered by the national government from 
1953 on. Violence did not dissipate, however. Numerous individuals and groups drifted 
towards banditry after 1953. 
The arrival of the National Front largely checked inter-party electoral violence, but 
did not eliminate all of the forces that had participated in it in the preceding decades. 
Some of the guerrillas active in the post-1958 period came under tutelage and financial 
support of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). Of the estimated 129 guerrilla and 
bandit groups active since the intensification of political violence in 1949, 47 (36 percent) 
still existed in 1963, and 22 (17 percent) were considered to be actively engaged in some 
form of illegal and violent activity.23 These bands were active in portions of Caldas, 
Cauca, Cundinamarca, Huila, Quindio, Tolima, Valle, and Cauca (Refer to Figure 1, page 
8). 
12 Osterling, Jorge, Democracy in Colombia, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA). 
1989,p.278. . 
n Guzman, German, La Violencia en Colombia, Vol. 2, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 
1962, pp. 282-326. 
31 
Between the establishment of the National Front and the appearance, in 1964, of the 
first communist guenillas, there were approximately 1,128 incidents of violence 
suspected to have some relationship to the Liberal-Conservative feud of a few years 
before.24 
The relationship with the PCC was firmly established by 1964, as evidenced by the 
fonnation in that year of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Southern Guerrilla 
Bloc, which became the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (F ARC) in 1966. In 
effect the Communist party sought to co-opt several of the then existing armed groups, 
the most prominent of which operated in the so called "independent Republics" of 
Marquetalia, El Pato, Guayabero and Sumapaz Regions (Departments of Cundinamarca 
and Tolima). The insurgent groups soon claimed ·') be revolutionaries in pursuit of 
national goals, yet geographically, they tended to operate in the same regions that were 
affected in the past by ''La violencia ". 
Military actions eliminated those guerrilla enclaves before the second half of the 
1960s. The guerrilla groups, including the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), which was 
created in 1968, made their reappearance in the 1970s. The groups in general used 
foreign models of revolution, expecting easy join of the masses to quickly join this effort 
against the elites. However, by the mid 1970s, it was clear that these movements were an 
important political factor in the country. Not one of these groups obtained complete 
support from the countrymen or even control over their organizations. Trapped by the 
army in their centers of operations, the EPL and ELN were near extinction, but the 
Ibid. 
32 
government stopped military action when it considered the groups defeated and willing to 
enter political negotiations. 
Guerrilla activity appeared to be under control, when two factors reinitiated the 
problem in the first half of the 1980s. First was the appearance of the M-19. Claiming 
fraud in the 1970 elections, the group began staging important actions which gave them 
free propaganda, and reintroduced the idea of achieving "real democracy" through the use 
of anned force. The second factor is the response of the Turbay govemment,25 which 
some analysts see as excessive. The persecution of several political activists and union 
leaders produced new recruits that reinforced the F ARC and helped to revive the EPL and 
ELN. 
In spite of the surge of guerrilla activity in the 1980s, the conditions that would 
have allowed the rise to power of these groups were not present. At the end of the 1980s, 
four major leftist guerrilla organizations were active in Colombia: The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (F ARC), with 6,000 members; the 19th of April Movement 
(M-19), with 2,000 members; the National Liberation Army (ELN), with 1 ,500 members; 
and the Popular Liberation Anny (EPL), with 600 members.26 A number of smaller, less 
structured guerrilla groups also carried out operations against the government. These 
included the Worker's Revolutionary Party (PRT), the Workers' Self-Defense Movement 
(MAO), Free Homeland (Patria Libre), and the Quintin Lame Command, formed by a 
Walker, Phyllis, "National Security", in Colombia: a Country Study, Washington, 1990, p. 
299. 
2
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February 16, 1987 issue of Nueva Frontera, p. 266. 
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small portion of the Colombian Indian population. During the late 1980s, analysts 
estimated that there were between 8,000 and 11,000 guerrillas.27 The groups were spread 
all over the country, but maintained the most active presence in the rural areas of the 
eastern planes and the Departments of Arauca, Antioquia (especially the Uraba Gulf), 
Southern Huila, Caqueta, Cordoba, Cesar, Cauca, and Northern and Southern Santanders. 
The first cease-fire agreement of the 1980's took place in 1984, during the 
government of Belisario Betancourt. The FARC, M-19, and th~ EPL agreed to be 
involved in a national dialogue to set the tenns for reincorporation into national life. 
However this dialogue was vaguely defined, and the groups resumed military activities 
after only a few months. The only tangible result of this effort was the formation of the 
Patriotic Union (UP), which is the political arm of the F ARC. The UP is still active 
today, although diminished due to internal conflicts and assassinations carried out by 
extremists of the right wing. This decline in UP support and participation is evidenced by 
voter behavior through the 1980's. In 1986, the UP received 2% of the total votes cast in 
congressional elections; by 1988, the UP percentage of total votes cast had dwindled to 
Another important feature of the 1980's was the intent of the guerrillas to be united 
in a common front. In 1986, the M-19 tried to form an "Americas Anny" by joining with 
Peru's Shining Path, the revolutionary movement Tupac Amaru, and Ecuador's Alfaro 
27 Walker, Phyllis, "National Security", in Colombia a Country Study, Washington, 1990, p. 
300. 
28 Registradurfa Nacional del Estado Civil (The Colombian government agency responsible for 
vote tabulation) as cited in Buitrago and Zamosc' s A/ Filo del Caos, p. 1 58. 
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Lives, Damn It! (!Alfaro vive, Carajol) group. The National Guerrillas were also 
organized into what was called the National Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CNG), which, 
after increasing attacks on and assassination of guerrilla sympathizers by right wing 
groups, was restructured as the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board 
( Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar). 
By the beginning of the 1990's some of these groups were reincorporated into 
national political life, and the M-19, the EPL and Indian groups are today represented in 
the Congress. The FARC, the ELN, and a small dissident fraction of the EPL are the 
groups that are presently active in traditional guerrilla activities. Today President 
Gaviria's government is negotiating with a dissident fraction of the ELN, which is 
expected to become a legal organization by mid-1994. 
In order to aJJow a more complete understanding of guerrilla activity in Colombia 
today, the following sections detail the origins and evolution of the four guerrilla groups 
that have had the most profound and continuing efforts on Colombian society; the F ARC, 
the ELN, M-19, and the EPL. 
1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FAR C) 
Today, the FARC remains the largest of Colombia's guerrilla groups. The group 
was founded in 1966 by Manuel Marulanda Velez -- known by the nickname Sure Shot 
( Tirofijo) -- and other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Colombia (PCC). At its beginning, the group included approximately 500 armed 
militants, and several thousand peasants were recruited as self defense groups for 
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support. 29 Military operations began as raids against rrjlitary posts and facilities to 
accumulate arms and equipment. By the early 1970s, the organization had been 
weakened by both government military operations and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Colombia and the Soviet Union. 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the F ARC came to the forefront, using the 
political situation of the country to gain support, and financing activities through 
kidnapping and extortion. By 1978, the F ARC maintained operations on five fronts, and 
by September 1980, the organization was regarded as the strongest of the guerrilla 
groups. In 1987, organization membership was estimated at 6,000 militants, who were 
active on at least twenty-seven fronts. 30 Today, its membership is reduced, as are the 
number of fronts of operation, due to the lack of support from the rural population and the 
recomposition strategies that have been applied by the government. 
l. The National Liberation Army (ELN) 
Founded in 1964 by Fabio Velasquez Castaiio, the ELN was inspired by the 
Cuban Revolution. Its leadership was composed mainly of students and graduates of the 
Industrial University of Santander Department.31 At the beginning, ELN activities 
centered on the Department of Santander, and included seizing temporary control of 
small towns, opening jails to free prisoners, robbing banks, and making anti-government 
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international notoriety in 1966, when it recruited Father Camilo Torres Restlepo, a well 
educated Roman Catholic Priest Only four months after taking up arms, Torres was 
killed in a confrontation with an army Patrol. 
In the early 1970s, the organization was decimated by an effective military 
counterinsurgency campaign in the vicinity of the Antioquia municipality of Anori in the 
Middle Magdalena River Valley.32 By 1975 the ELN had regained its strength, engaging 
in kidnappings, bank robberies, and assassinations, including the killing of the Inspector 
General of the Army General Ramon Arturo Rincon Quiiiones. The ELN was the only 
major guerrilla group that did not sign the 1984 cease-fire agreement. In the late 1980's, 
the ELN was estimated to have a membership of more than 1,500.33 Its theater of 
operations is centered around the departments of Arauca, Santander, Northern Santander, 
and Cesar. Today, the ELN is headed by the another Catholic priest, the Spaniard 
Manuel Perez (Cura Perez). The group is notorious for its constant attacks on 
Colombian economic institutions and foreign investors, including kidnappings and 
attacks that target petroleum installations, pipelines, and exploratory drilling sites. 
3. The M-19 Movement 
The 19th of April Movement, M-19, traces its origins to the allegedly fraudulent 
presidential elections of April 19, 1970, when the former military Dictator Rojas Pinilla 
of the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), was defeated by Misael Pastrana Borrero. 
32 Osterling, Jorge, Democracy in Colombia, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA), 
1989, p. 308. 
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During the early 1970s, Carlos Toledo Plata and Jaime Bateman Cayon distinguished 
themselves as M-19's principal leaders and ideologues.34 Toledo, a physician, was an 
ANAPO representative in Congress. Bateman served as M-19's principal coiMWlder for 
military operations. Both these men died during the 1980s - Toledo shot by two men 
believed linked to right-wing extremists financed by the drug cartels, and Bateman in an 
airplane crash. 
The M-19 ideological orientation was a mixture of populism and nationalistic 
revolutionary socialism. By 1985, the group was estimated to have between 1,500 and 
2,000 members, making it the second largest guerrilla group in that time period. 3s The 
beginnings of the group were based in urban operations. In 1974, the group's theft of 
Simon Bolivar's sword and spurs gained it national attention. Two years later, the group 
kidnapped and murdered a union official accused of having ties to the CIA. By 1977, the 
M-19 began a campaign of economic sabotage, targeting government officials and offices 
of multinational corporations in an effort to drive foreign investment from the country. In 
1980, the seizure and occupation, for sixty-one days, of the Dominican Republic's Bogota 
Embassy, during which twelve diplomatic personnel, including the United States 
ambassador, were held hostage, gained the group international notoriety. 
In 1984, M-19 joined the cease-fire agreement proposed by Betancourt's 
government, but late in 1985 the accord unraveled, and they returned to armed 
14 Osterling, jorge, Democracy in Colombia, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA), 
1989, p. 300. 
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confrontations. In October 1985, the group wounded the then Commanding General of 
the Army, Samudio. By far, the most spectacular operation ofM-19 came the following 
month, when its commandos seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota. The ensuing battle 
between M-19 and the military left over 100 dead, including 11 Supreme Court Judges 
and all the guerrillas present in the operation. 36 
After this incident the group's activity diminished. The group attempted to join 
with other Latin American guerrillas, but this intent was prevented by a military 
anti-insurgent campaign. In March 1987, the group's top political and military strategist, 
Alvaro Fayad, was killed. At the end of the 1980s, the group signed a peace agreement 
with the government of Virgilio Barco. M-19 leader Carlos Pizarro became a presidential 
candidate, but was killed by agents of the Medellin Cartel, and was subsequently replaced 
by Antonio Navarro Wolf. 
4. The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) 
The EPL was the only major group to espouse a Maoist political ideology, 
endorsing the concept of prolonged popular war. Organized in 1968, as the armed front 
of the Marxist Leninist Communist Party (a dissident pro-Peking group of the PCC), its 
first military operations were in the Department of Cordoba on the Caribbean Coast. The 
founders were Pedro Vasquez Rendon, Pedro Leon Arboleda, Francisco Caraballo, Oscar 
Willian Calvo, and Libardo Mora. Internal dissension, and the deaths of some of its key 
leaders during the 1970s, weakened the EPL's operational capabilities. Despite its Maoist 
orientation, the group chose to participate in the cease-fire agreement of 1984, but it 
lf> Ibid. 
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refused to sign a peace agreement. Following the death of its leader, Emesto Rojas, the 
organization broke the cease fire. In 1987 the EPL's size was estimated at approximately 
600 guerrillas organized on four fronts. 37 In 1991, the group signed a peace agreement 
with the government, and was allowed, along with the political movement M-19, to 
participate in the development of the new constitution and the following Congress. The 
group has recently changed its name to "Hope, Peace, and Liberty" (Esperanza Paz y 
Libertad -- EPL ). 
B. INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIETAL STAKEHOLDERS 
Since the mid-19111 century, the Liberal and Conservative parties have been 
practically the only social organizations to identify a civil society in a process of 
configuration. Together with the Catholic church, this bipartisanship defined the political 
capacity of the State in an underdeveloped, regionally fragmented, agrarian society. 
The principal problem with bipartisan government was not only its reduction of 
social coverage, but the effects for the state produced by the political configuration after 
the National Front. By the 1970's, the State was effective in responding to social 
demands only in as much as the response would generate votes. Any other type of 
interest, not related to electoral capital, was processed in an incidental way. Within this 
framework, the dynamic of the system was dependent on a "clientship" use of the State's 
resources. 
)7 Ibid, p. 307. 
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In contrast, the organiutions from capitalist sectors - generally the production and 
commercialization groups - generally bad been capable of breaking the bipartisan 
machinery when their interests were in jeopardy, generating policies that favored these 
groups at the expense of the popular classes. This near-to-direct political access of such 
organizations was facilitated by the capitalist rationale at work in the macroeconomic 
policies of the State. That rationale bad been used by the executive branch, sometimes 
behind the back of the congress and political parties, against the official bureaucracy of 
clientship. 
The mentioned weaknesses of the political system plus the inefficient interventions 
of the state, generated a political and social crisis. This crisis revolved around the 
credibility and legitimacy of political institutions. The principal axis of the political 
conflict was no longer between Liberals and Conservatives, but between those who 
supported and believed in the system, and those who opposed it. The guerrillas focused 
their efforts against the established order, advocating revolutionary war as the only means 
of achieving profound change. The country's commercial and social institutions, whether 
of their own volition or as victims of circumstance, also became stakeholders in the 
insurgent confrontation. As guerrilla activity alternately blessed and blighted these 
institutions they came to exert influences of there own on the crisis. 
The institutional stakeholders are the political parties, the industrialists, the 
Catholic Church, and the military.38 Each of these groups believes in the system and in 
-------- -----
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general are negatively affected by the actions of the guerrillas, or the possibility of change 
in the established order. Societal stakeholders relationship to insurgency is more 
complex. The workers, the rural population, and various civic movements expect change, 
and in that sense they are vulnerable to guerrilla actions that coincide with their interests. 
However, when there is the possibility of achieving change through dialogue, they prefer 
this less expensive method, and become supporters of the system. Due to this particular 
situation, they are sometimes between the lines of fire between the guerrillas and the 
institutional stakeholders. The interests of this group are individual, rather than societal, 
but are driven by economic motivations. Depending on how guerrilla activity affects 
their illegal activities, they are either allies or enemies of the insurgency. 
1. The Political Parties 
When the bipartisan system was institutionalized, the Colombian parties 
represented an extension of the oligarchic structure that dominated Colombian society. 
Challenges to the traditional structure of power, including those represented in insurgent 
actions, were systematically frustrated throughout Colombian history, due to the ability of 
dominant groups to control resources in moments of serious danger. In examining the 
history of the historical parties, it is possible to see how the bipartisan control of the 
country contributed to the choice of violence as a means of change. 
a. Orgt~niZtJtiontll Structure of the P11rties 
Since the beginning of the republic. Colombian political movements have 
tended to organize themselves around strong leaders, who themselves have tended to 
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gravitate toward the bases power held by the two traditional parties. People have avidly 
followed regional and national leaders in electoral debates and armed conflicts. Political 
activists and the people at large have tended to identify themselves with names of 
politicians at the national level. As a result, politicians have become individualists, 
creating in their parties a considerable amount of factionalism. Sometimes the division of 
the parties has resulted in the loss of a presidential election which the party as a whole 
has maintained a clear majority. Sometimes alliances are made with factions across party 
boundaries further confusing the political landscape. It has been argued that the parties 
did not have governing programs or structured ideologies, but were rather interested in 
being elected to gain access to public resources. 
Early on, the Colombian parties were dominated by a close circle of 
professional politicians from the upper and middle classes. They were territorially 
decentralized, with departments (provinces) as the basic electoral units, and decision 
making performed by the national congressmen. Even if the members of a party were in 
alignment with one leader, it did not indicate the presence of an oligarchic structure for 
decision making; the relationship was more of a reciprocal one. The center of historical 
partisan activity was in the congress. Due to a lack of organi~tional strength, the 
congressmen have depended significantly on their electoral machinery for reelection. 
The basic resow-ce for bargaining has been governmental patronage in the form of 
bureaucratic employment and dispensation of funds. 
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Even with the ongoing corruption inherent in such a system, however, the 
impact of clientship in elections diminished considerably in recent years. This is due, in 
part, to the modernization of the country. As more modem conveniences have been made 
available to urban populations, the ability of the political establishment to offer them 
something more has diminished. Also, the growth of urban areas (which came to include 
70% of the population), decreased the power of the clientship practices, which were 
historically more effective in rural areas. Another factor that affected the decline of 
clientship was the growth of the middle class, which is, in the main, employed in the 
private sector, and views government expenditure from the perspective of the taxpayer, 
rather than as a beneficiary of social services. 39 
The incentives provided by politicians helped them during congressional 
election campaigns, but were not enough to manipulate the course of presidential 
elections. Even though congressional politicians influence the nomination of presidential 
candidates, the campaign for the presidency has its own dynamic, more dependent on 
individual charisma than on clientship practices. 
The political passions fueled the period known as La Violencia are no longer 
present. Present evidence suggests that there is a growing proportion of citizens who no 
longer identify with the traditional parties; either choosing to vote independently r· not 
vote at all. In Bogota for example, among eligible voters Liberal Party membership 
decreased from 61% in 1970 to 36.3% in 1982, and that of the Conservative Party from 
J• Hoskin, Gary, Postnational Front Trends in the Colombian Political Party System, Pittsburgh, 
1979, p. 22. 
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25.3% to 18.90,4 over the same period . .., For this reason, elections, particularly for 
president elections, are each time more dependent on the candidate's ability to appeal to 
individuals, rather than party blocs. An example of this trend was the victory in 1982 of 
the Conservative candidate Belisario Betancourt, when the majority of voters in the 
election were Liberal. 
b. Democratic Trt~nsition 1111d Politic11l Crisis 
In the 1980's, Colombian society was looking for more political participation 
and more equitable distribution of wealth, yet the politicians managed to avoid such 
change. After the demise of the National Front, presidents tried to implement 
institutional reform (specifically constitutional reform), but the Supreme Court and the 
Congress were reluctant to modify the system by which they had come to power. Over 
time, the inability to achieve reform within the system became apparent and, as a result, 
disgruntled interests began to resort to extra-legal channels. 
Two other problems contributed to limiting the capacity of the parties to 
achieve political reform. Even though they are independent, parties' autonomy tends to 
be counter-productive, leading to the pursuit of narrowly defined and exclusive interests. 
When the parties do not include a wide spectrum of interests in their program, a crisis of 
representation come occur, limiting the state's ability to effectively conduct the business 
of the people. Even if the government can legitimately function as a representation of the 
people, the division between party interest and national interest can stall the decision 
making process. Since the times of GaitAn, Colombians have talked about the "political 
40 Ibid. 
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country" and the "national country" to represent the separation between parties and 
government that impede$ progress in structural refonn. 
2. The MUitary 
While an in-depth analysis of the military's involvement in Colombian 
insurgency issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
institution's position as a stakeholder in the crisis of political violence. This is true for 
two reasons. First, it is the military who executes the government's strategies to directly 
confront the guerrilla threat. Similarly, when the government launches a peace initiative, 
and directs the military to reduce its attacks on guerrilla units, it is the military that must 
contend with a renewed and revived guerrilla population if and when those peace 
initiatives fail. Secondly, the military has constitutional obligations to the nation other 
than those involving internal security. While there are a myriad motivations of 
individual military officers, ranging from concern over the country's fu~re to a 
deep-seated aversion to the guerrillas, the two factors mentioned above are what brings 
the military to the issue as an institutional stakeholder in the early 1990s. 
In Colombia, the armed forces include the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and 
the National Police. The Army is the biggest of the forces (109,000), with a size about 
ten times that of the Air Force (9,500) and seven times that of the Navy (15,500). 1 The 
National Police are comparable in size to the Army. 
----- -------- ---
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Beside the historic reasons, the nature of the internal conflicts in Colombia, 
explain the preponderance of land forces. The basic characteristic of the forces to be 
implanted in the national territory is dispersion. Is very hard to find a tactical unit 
(battalion), complete in one place. The Anny has mostly light equipment, and 
independently of the internal conflict, the topography of the national territory make 
difficult the operation of heavy equipment. 
The Officers and Petty-Officers are professionals, and the mass of troops is 
composed by draftees. The military service in Colombia is compulsory, but because of 
reasons of size, only part of the eligible citizens are recruited. In the present, the Anny is 
using with great success the concept of "professional soldiers" for special operations. 
The base of recruitment had changed in the last twenty years. From recruiting rural 
population, the tendency in the present is mostly urban (because of the rapid urbanization 
of the society), and include a wide spectrum of the different social classes.42 
a. The Modern Colombian MUitary 
The evolution of the modern Colombian military has involved three distinct 
phases since the inauguration of the Reyes presidency at the tum of the century.43 
In the first of these phases of development came about with the installation of 
the Reyes' government after the War of a Thousand Days. The government believed that 
developing the military as an institution of the state, rather than as various militias with 
42 College students from the middle and upper class are included, but their service is short and 
not involved in counter-insurgency control. 
41 Maullin, Richard L., Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, Rand Corporation, 1973, 
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allegiance to factions and parties, would serve to give all Colombians an institution in 
which to take national pride and place trust. It was also a central government aim to 
involve the military as a major player in rebuilding the infrastructure of the country that 
had been in large measure destroyed during th~ period of civil war. Their purpose was 
two-fold. First, it was hoped that the people's view of the military as a non-partisan and 
benevolent institution would be enhanced. Secondly, the military that the Reye's 
government conceived was the only institution that was capable of taking on the task of 
rebuilding roads, bridges, and lines of communication. It was during this phase of the 
military's development that the Military Cadet School, the Naval Cadet School, and the 
Superior War College were founded. The Superior War College was modeled on 
Prussia's Kreigsacademie, and is perhaps the most visible example of the i _:luence of 
Prussian military thought on the Colombian military throughout this phase of 
development. The focus on Prussian, or more generally European, military philosophy 
was intended to develop a professional military that would avoid political involvement at 
all costs. In keeping with this line of thinking, the government began to develop a 
national system of compulsory military service, and to open military educational 
institutions to students across the social and economic classes of the country. By the 
mid-1920s, compulsory service had been adopted, and an increasing number of students 
enrolled at the Military Cadet School came from the middle class. 
The second period was inaugurated by external conflict and involved an 
expansion of the military and a review of its operational practices. In the mid-1930s, 
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Colombia became involv~ in a territorial conflict with Peru over an area along the 
Amazon River. The confrontation centered around the town of Leticia, but most of the 
military action was waged in the surrounding jungle. This dispute, in which the military 
was successful in defending Colombia's territorial interests, was significant in the 
development of the modem military for tWo reasons. First, the ranks of the military 
swelled with Colombians united in a national cause. In giving the nation a cause around 
which to unite for the achievement of national, rather than partisan, goals, the conflict 
was in large measure responsible for developing a professionally non-political military. 
This would prove to be a crucial factor, for many of the young recruits of the military and 
its educational institutions during this period, and for several years thereafter, would later 
lead the military through the periods of violence and instability that were to come. The 
second impact of the conflict was to force the military leadership to realize two things: 
the European mode of making war was entirely inappropriate to the jungles of South 
America, and; beyond internal considerations, such as maintaining a professional, 
non-partisan orientation and serving to advance the development of the country, the 
military bad external security responsibilities for which it was ill-prepared. Before the 
outbreak of conflict with Peru, any attempt to procure more resources for an expansion of 
the military was contingent on the military's ability to provide social services, according 
to the original intent of the Reyes' government. The sudden realization of the possibility 
of external conflict caused a considerable increase in resources available to the military. 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, military-civil relations were strained by the 
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election of the Liberal Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, who made no secret of his disdain for 
military officers, whom he considered to be instruments of the Conservative party. His 
solution for putting the military to use and maintaining his hold on power was to send 
military units to colonize remote parts of the country. This plan was not well received by 
the military, which now viewed itself as a professional, battle hardened force. A 
subsequent Liberal president, Eduardo Santos, was more interested in building upon the 
civil-military relationship, and World War II provided an excellent vehicle for the task. 
The European military missions that had been closed during and after the war with Peru 
as a result of the failure of European battle strategy were replaced with a military mission 
from the United States, offering training and technology in return for a joint strategy of 
defense for the Panama Canal. It was Lopez intention that the military focus on 
developing its technological and strategic capabilities, and he further hoped that close ties 
with the US military might extend the development of a military institution that was 
non-partisan and promoted democratic ideals. 
The third period of the military's development revolved around the issues of 
counter-insurgency and internal security, and evolved along with the period of political 
conflict known as La Violencia. As conflict between Conservatives and Liberals 
intensified through the latter half of the 1940s, it became increasingly apparent that the 
National Police were incapable of maintaining order. The military became more and 
more involved in trying to maintain peace throughout the country. When Laureano 
Gomez was elected in the 1949 elections that were boycotted by the Liberal Party, he saw 
so 
the military as another instrument to use against the Liberals. He increased the military 
budget by 81% within his first two years in office, and advdllced the view that the 
military's loyalty to the state rested on its allegiance to the Conservative Party. The 
military leadership was concerned over the politicization of the military, but another 
world event, the Korean War, provided Gomez with an opportunity to give the military 
leadership something else to think about. Over 3,000 Colombian troops were committed 
to the UN cause in Korea and, for the moment, the military policy revolved around the 
provision, training, and support of this mission. All the while, however, the military was 
taking on an increasing role in the country's internal peacekeeping activities. This period 
of development of the Colombian military as the institution responsible for public order 
climaxed in 1953, when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla carried out a coup under the 
banner of "The Military Government." 
b. The Military's Political View 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, Colombia's military has struggled 
to maintain a non-political stance throughout the country's history. This struggle has 
revolved primarily around the operative definition of "guerrilla" at any given point in 
time. Colombia has known partisan guerrillas, known to their supporters as patriots, as 
well as guerrillas who reject the notion of the multi-party political system in its entirety. 
The tendency of the Colombian military has been to aggressively pursue insurgents in the 
latter category, and to more carefully navigate a non-partisan course in periods when 
political violence has maintained a partisan character. 
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Rojas' came to power with the consent of the military, but the principal 
reason for his rise to power was the fact that both Liberal and Conservative party leaders 
were alanned by the increasingly autocratic nature of the Gomez presidency. While 
Gomez began as a Conservative, his personal political leanings where more Falangist in 
nature. The Liberal party was always opposed to Gomez, but it took time for the 
Conservative party to realize that his actions were not in their interests. At the same time, 
the military was becoming increasingly concerned over its role in supporting a regime 
that did not represent the democratic expression of the Colombian people's will. 
The Rojas' dictatorship, for that is what it became, soon began to resemble 
the Gomez administration that it had replaced. As time went on, it became increasingly 
apparent to the military leadership that the main aim of the Rojas' regime was to increase 
the personal influence of its head, and excluded the welfare of the country. Despite the 
efforts of Liberal and Conservative politicians, and careful suggestions on the part of the 
military leadership, Rojas' continued to operate in an autocratic and arbitrary manner. 
For the military, consenting to Rojas' seizure of power reflected the military's 
willingness to serve as an arbiter of dispute and interim source of leadership so that the 
country's political disputes could be resolved before the deteriorated into another period 
of civil war. By 1957, it was clear to the military that this goal was not shared by the 
Rojas' regime. In one of the most important decisions ever made by the Colombian 
military, a group representing all military commands removed Rojas' from power on May 
10, 1957. 
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While the Rojas' period of power is generally referred to as a period of 
"military government," it was only after the military deposed ~ that it truly had an 
opportunity to rule the country. At this point, the military was popular with the people: 
it had removed a dictator from power, and it represented the single national institution 
which considered national, as opposed to regional or sectoral, interests. If anyone 
thought the military to be concerned with its own interests over those of the nation, 
subsequent events were to prove how wrong they were. 
The Junta Militar which replaced Rojas immediately began a process of 
national reconciliation, with the objective of restoring civilian government. Within one 
year, the National Front had come to office. 
During the National Front, the military retained its internal focus, but 
developed an even more active role in the general development of the country. Minister 
of Defense General Alberto Ruiz Novoa was convinced that, just as important as the duty 
of combating active insurgents, the military had a responsibility to aid the development of 
the nation so as to prevent conditions that had previously motivated people to engage in 
political violence. 
c. The Milit11ry's St11/ce 
The Colombian Armed Forces, have some unique characteristics among 
traditional Latin American military institutions, among them: 
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• There is no tradition of military governments. Even the short arrival of the military 
to power from 1953 to 1957, was marked by conflicts between the political parties, 
which left temporary military leadership as the only available option. 
• Colombian military expenditures, and the size of its armed forces, is very modest in 
comparative terms. By the late 1980s, Colombia had the lowest military 
expenditure in South America as a proportion of the GNP.44 
• Since 1948, the Armed Forces, especially the Army, has been immersed in tasks of 
control of the public order. The demands of internal security situations occupy the 
virtual majority of army activity, and considerable portions of the resources of the 
other military branches as well. 
The militaries by constitution must be apolitical. The politicians constantly 
invoke this characteristic, and deliberations or opinions of military leaders about internal 
issues are usually not permitted. This opinion can be summarized in a speech made by 
president Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958: 
Politics are not going to enter the bodies of national defense; any pressure 
could not lead me to oppose what I understand as the protection of peace and the 
warranty of good defense for the Republic, which is the impartiality, and political 
neutrality of the Armed Forces.45 
According with Armando Borrero, the political orientation of the Armed 
Forces had been the Anti-Communism, and criticize the low emphasis in the internal 
conditions of the conflict.46 However, the military involvement in helping social 
.. Borrero, Armando, "Militares Politica y Sociedad" in A/ Fifo del Caos, Buitrago, F., ed., 
1991, p. 175. 
·~ lleras, Alberto, Escritos Selectos, Colombian Institute of Culture, Bogota, 1976, p. 136. 
•b Borrero, Armando, "Militares, Politica y Sociedad", in A/ Fifo del Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, 
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development have been an historic constant. Russell Ramsey'" describe the officers 
involved in this efforts as members of a "Humanistic School" within the .Military Forces. 
One of the examples that he presents, is the Anny Colonel Eduardo Roman Bazurto, who 
in the 1950s, organized successful programs of self-defense to prevent violence in the 
"Llanos" (eastern planes). Also in 1962 the Minister of Defense General Alberto Ruiz 
Novoa, was convinced that the Anny not only was a tool to destroy the guerrilla, but a 
tool to attack the social and economic causes as well as the historic political reasons for 
their existence. Since he was minister of war, the military training broadened to include 
courses in social sciences, the units develop civic-military actions, and more enlisted 
personnel participate in programs of the National Manpower Training Agency (Servicio 
Nacional de Aprendizaje --SENA), literacy training, and agricultural schooling.48 
However, military efforts to intervene the causes of the violence, usually are 
not tolerated by the political country, and disagreement with government policies have 
cost the careers to some brilliant Officers. 
In the counter-insurgency war the Armed Forces had gain support from the 
government, to independently develop their own military strategy against the subversion, 
the selection of commands, and the development of internal policies. The experience of 
the Colombian Armed Forces in guerrilla warfare is one of the highest in the world. The 
operational version of this doctrine originally develop from General Alberto Ruiz's "Plan 
ed., Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991, p. 181. 
47 Ramsey, Russell, Guerril/eros y Soldados, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 1981, p. 182. 
48 Maullin, Richard, Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia, RAND Corporation, 1973, 
p. 69. 
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Lazo" in early 1960549, and with the updates from the present bad been decisive in 
avoiding the spread of the guerrilla influence. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Anned Forces bad also supported government policies dealing with peace efforts to finish 
the guerrilla. 
3. lndustry50 
By the end of 1981, the dominant elements of Colombian society were 
beginning to re-orient their policies to confront subversion. As it had in the past, 
subversion was becoming the method of choice for opposing governments who, in the 
eyes of many workers, bad allied themselves with industry in working to defeat initiatives 
aimed at industrial refonn. The capitalists of the industrial groups closely followed the 
progress of refonn in the legislature, as well as the progress of anti-insurgent efforts 
across the country. 
11. Structur11l Elements 
The industrial groups of interest are endowed with vast resources, including 
publication enterprises, and are capable of economic and political analysis. They have 
historically been natural critics of the executive branch. They have few relations with the 
Congress -- except the fanner's and cattle industry associations -- because Congress is 
interested in clientship practices, and so are not able to affect the economic policies and 
public investment. Such groups are careful to be discreet about the details of their 
financial relations with the government, but the involvement of some industrial 
4
q Ibid, p. 69. 
sn Chronological information on industrialist groups is based on Gremios Industriales ante Ia 
Crisis, Kalmanovitz, Salomon, 1989. 
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organizations in decisions regarding disposition of industcy-based public revenues is well 
known. That is the case, for example, for the Coffee Federation, which invests export 
taxes in public works projects in coffee producing areas. 51 Today, however, the system is 
more decentralized. Local governments are able to devote more of their budgets to public 
investment, and now the various industrial groups must have better relations with 
administration at the local level. 
b. Rellltions with the Government lifter the N11tionlll Front 
During the years of the National Front, industry was progressing 
systematically, arriving at 14.8% of the GNP by the end of the period. Between 1968 and 
1974, the annual growth rate was 8%, and industry was responsible for 22.9% of GNP.52 
At that time, optimism was evident in the country, and Fabio Correa, the president of the 
National Association of Industrialists (Asociacion Nacional de Industriales --ANDI), 
affirmed publicJy that the climate of peace and prosperity had been created during the 
National Front, and could be the model for future economic realizations. Subsequent 
economic development was turbulent, however, and the various social issues that arose 
were hard to resolve, especially without major political and institutional changes. 
The reforms made during the government of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen were 
an effort to liberalize the accumulation of capital, reduce financial restrictions, and 
increase foreign commerce. After his presidency, analysts suggest that there was a moral 




Urrutia, Miguel, Gremios, Politica Econ6mica y Democracia, Fedesarrollo, Bogota, 198l. 
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The rapid increase in the price of coffee since 1975, and the apogee of 
exports - including drug trafficking -- had put in doubt the capacity of the 
Colombian State to channel in a productive way the unexpected abundance and 
avoid negative consequences in income distribution. 53 
By the early 1980's, opposition to the government had become general. The 
situation deteriorated further: the economy was in recession, with high inflation, high 
interest rates and a growing deficit.54 The industrial groups were extremely critical of 
economic policies and the government in general. In February 1981, several groups, 
including the ANDI, CAMACOL (Construction), FENALCO (Commerce) and ANIF 
(Finance), joined together to condemn the government and its actions. They demanded a 
"global reorientation" of economic policy in order to return to protectionism and a 
finance system that favored capital accumulation. Another sore point for these groups 
were the measures that permitted the development of black markets, which had, in their 
view, carried the productive sector to the brink of bankruptcy. At this time, marihuana 
trafficking was in apogee, and cocaine trafficking was just over the horizon. However, a 
general strike in 1981 again forced the government and the industrial groups to reconcile, 
and together they neutralized the efforts of the unions. 
c. The Pe11ce Tt~lks 
In 1982, most of the country was talking about peace with the guerrilla 
organizations. At the end of 1981, the ANDI began a campaign advancing the idea that 
peace must be a national objective, and offering support to all initiatives that contributed 
~ 1 Pecaut, Daniel. Cr6nir.a de dos Decadas de Polftica Colombiana, Siglo XXI editores, 
Bogota, 1989, p. 247. 
54 Pecaut, Daniel, Cronica de dos Decadas de Polftica Colombiana, Siglo XXI editores, 
Bogota, 1989, p. 320. 
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to peace. In May of that year, Belisario Betancourt received the highest number of votes 
ever in a presidential election. 
At that moment the different groups were focusing their efforts on exalting 
the new president and his government's programs. The ANDI was convinced that the 
style of this president was a good reason to be optimistic. In this environment, when the 
president launched his efforts toward national reconciliation, the different groups kept 
silent, focused instead on economic issues. In November 1982, the groups asked for an 
economic amnesty to face the coming recession, one of the hardest in the country's 
history. 
In 1983, at the same time when the ANDI publicly supported the peace 
initiatives, ability of the government to create the appropriate atmosphere for its 
development was questioned. The people in general were worried about the negative 
response of the guerrilla groups. The agricultural industry was clearly in a crisis, and 
rural investment was low due to guerrilla activities in those areas. The ANDI viewed 
elimination of the illegal farming and rural unemployment as possible only after the 
guerrilla problem had been resolved. At that moment, the narcotics trafficking industry 
was consolidating and introducing $2 billion US dollars per year into the country, but 
narcotics traffickers were considered a minor problem when compared with guerrilla 
activities. 55 
In 1984, the ANDI supported the agreements between the government and 
FARC and M-19. At that time their greatest concern was the condition of the economy. 
Kalmanovitz, Salomon, Economia del Narcotrafico en Colombia, Bogota, 1990. 
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Foreign investment had stagnated, foreign debt and the deficit were growing, and 
industrial development was very low. In October, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
asked the government for drastic adjustments if the country was expecting more loans. 
The response of the industrial groups was immediate; they considered the autonomy of 
the country in jeopardy, and felt that the national interest demanded long and painful 
measures to recuperate the economy. 
Economic difficulties began to diminish, the support of the industrial groups 
for the government. Their position on peace was articulated by ACOPI (Colombian 
Association of Little Industrialists): "We want peace, but not at any price, not giving up 
sovereignty and the law." By 1985, the ANDI was publicly highlighting its concerns 
about the national security, and their advertising against the communist threat posed by 
the guerrillas increased. ANDI supports the governments' response to M-19's takeover of 
the Pa1a~e of Justice in November, 1985. 
In 1986 Virgilio Barco was elected president, and again the economic groups 
sent a supportive message, expressing their willingness to support the necessary 
economic measures to recover the economy. President Barco's characteristics changed 
the relationship between the president and the industrial groups. During the first stage of 
his government, the relations deteriorated, but the groups decided to wait for the 
appropriate moment to use their influence. In 1988, the government put out the so-called 
"statute for democracy," which included severe measures against narcotics-trafficking. 
guerrillas, terrorism, and organized crime. Barco asked the political parties, the economic 
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groups, the church and the media to join in this purpose and agree on global strategies. 
Once again, the government and the different industrial groups were again involved 
together in a peace process. 
4. The CathoDe Church 
Colombia is an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country. The influence of the 
Church throughout Colombian history is present in every aspect of the national life. The 
tenacity of custom and the Church's traditional position as a moral and social arbiter 
ensured its continued presence in Colombian society. The parish church is still the center 
of small communities, and the local priest is often the major figure of authority and 
leadership. Approximately 95 percent of diocesan priests and 75 percent of priests 
belonging to religious orders are Colombians. 56 Since independence, all but four bishops 
have been Colombian. 
Still today, there are formal relations with the Vatican through a Concordat. The 
existence of this agreement helped to mold the role of the church in the society. Maybe 
the most controversial aspects of this treaty are those related to the official status of the 
religion, the mission territories, education, and marriage. First, the church accepted 
Roman Catholicism as the religion of the great majority of Colombians, but agreed that 
other religions are accepted and treated the same. Second, the mission territories-- lands 
with Indian populations -- ceased to be enclaves where Catholic missionaries had greater 
jurisdiction than government; by agreement, the vast network of schools and social 
-- ----------- -~-~------ --------- ---------
56 Bagley, Bruce, "The Society and its Environment", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
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services were transferred to the government. Third, the Church surrendered its right to 
censor public education and enforce the use of the Catholic catechism in public schools. 
Finally, Colombians would be allowed to contract civil marriages without abjuring the 
Catholic faith. The civil validity of Catholic weddings is recognized, although all 
marriages were also to be recorded on the civil registry. Catholic marriages in the past 
could only be dissolved through arbitration in a church court; today there is acceptance of 
a civil procedure. 
Colombia has changed a lot in the last 50 years. According to Malcom Deas, a 
British historian, expert in Colombian issues, "one of the biggest changes occurring for 
the Church was an accelerated secularization of society, which years ago was 
unimaginable." He also mentions urbanization and the growth of a new middle class, the 
crisis of the family institution, the new professional role of women, and administrative 
and economic corruption. Other controversial changes are related to family planning and 
birth control, which have allowed the country to reduce the birth rate. 
11. Changes Jnsule the Church 
Due to changes in Colombian society beginning in the 1940s, the church had 
been involved in activities such as social welfare (communal action) and union 
organization. During the National Front, the role of the church as a supporter of the 
Conservative party was finished. s? Of equal importance was the process of renewal that 
characterized the worldwide Roman Catholic Church in the early 1960s. Both Pope John 
57 Gonzales, Fernan, "La Iglesia Jerarquica", in A/ Filo del Caos, Buitrago, francisco, ed., 
Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 229. 
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XXIII and Pope Paul VI issued a series of encyclicals that were unequaled in their efforts 
to modernize the church as an institution and modify its role in society. These 
encyclicals stressed the government's obligation to reduce socioeconomic inequalities and 
the church's obligation to take a leading role in reform. However, the majority of the 
Colombian clergy were surprised by these reforms. Some of them did not support 
freedom of religion, and only superficially accepted the new ideas. 
Although the Papal encyclicals pointed the Colombian episcopate in the 
direction of change, it was not until the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference 
(CELAM) in Medellin that these proposed reforms were delivered in the form of a 
declaration specifically involving Latin America. However, the difficulty of synthesizing 
a single position on Latin America became apparent when, unlike other Latin American 
bishops, the Colombian bishops shied away from some of the more dramatic aspects of 
the Medellin conclusions. They did not for example, accept the conference's conclusion 
that institutionalized violence characterized Latin America societies, maintaining that this 
conclusion was primarily informed by the viewpoint of bishops from the Southern Cone 
countries, and was not appropriate to the situation in Colombia, nor to several other Latin 
American nations. Unable to change the shape of Medellin documents, the Colombian 
bishops published a dissenting treatise in the secular press. 
b. Social and Political Influence of the Church 
The bishops' inability to agree on an approach to social reform and to 
implement it through strong and effective leadership increased the fragmentation within 
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the church in Colombia, and the general controversy surrounding the Church's role in 
Society. Some of the problems developed over organizational, rather than ideological, 
disagreements between groups fighting for the same resources or powerful positions. 
Consequently, only development programs operating in strongly Catholic areas had 
substantial success. 
Some of the modem priests, influenced by the new ideas of the Church, 
became involved with leftist groups in a dialogue for which they were not ready. Their 
lack of knowledge in social sciences lead them to over-value the Marxist theories. Some 
of them began to part from the guidance of the ecclesiastic. hierarchy. 
Frustration over the lack of dynamic leadership caused some priests to strike 
out in their own. The first to do so was Camilo Torres Restrepo. He initially represented 
an intent to enter a of dialogue with the university world, the social sciences, and a 
society he considered unfair. He soon became more radical, insisting that Christian love, 
to be effective, needed to be converted to science, politics, and even political violence. 
According to his ideas, the revolution was necessary to achieve the effective love 
demanded in his faith. Torres was killed in 1966, less than six months after he joined the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), thus becoming the first so-called martyr of the 
communist revolutionary movement .58 
In the late 1960s, many Colombian clergymen, encouraged by Torres' 
example, were determined to work for social change. Except for Gerardo Va1encia Cano, 
se Gonzales, Fernan, "La Iglesia Jerarquica", in AI Filo del Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, ed., 
Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 240. 
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Bishop of Buenaventura, none of the episcopate supported this work. In spite of the 
rejections of the Medellin conclusions by the majority of Colombian bishops, the activists 
led by Bishop Valencia became the first group in Latin America to issue a manifesto and 
a platform for social reform based on the resolutions of the Medellin conference. 
Meeting in 1968, and taking the name "Golconda" -- after the farmhouse in Viota 
(Cundinamarca) where they first met -- the group led the revolutionary wing of the 
Colombian church until early 1970. The Golconda group became involved in political as 
well as social issues, but their advocacy of violence caused many Colombians to tum 
away, and after a government campaign against them -- some were imprisoned -- and the 
death of Bishop Valencia, the group ceased to exist. Despite the fact that their efforts to 
effect sweeping social changes were not successful, members of the Golconda group 
came to be considered forerunners of the controversial "Liberation Theology Movement" 
among Catholic clergy elsewhere in the western hemisphere. 59 
The Jack of active commitment on the part of the bishops had several effects. 
On one hand, the weakness of the hierarchy's approval and/or disapproval of radical 
clergy led to confusion in the public interpretation of Catholic social ideology among 
Colombians. Additionally, the lack of protection against government repression 
convinced many that the official church was not genuinely interested in change. Finally. 
the national effort towards socio-economic development was hampered because, without 
consensus, the impact of the church on reform remained piecemeal. 
19 Bagley, Bruce, "The Society and its Environment", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed., Washimgton, 1988, p. 117. 
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The one way in which the church may have been politically important was in 
upholding the legitimacy and survival of Colombia's oligarchic democracy, against many 
predictions and in contrast to the politics of many other countries. It came to this position 
in the mid 1950s, after having been long divided over identification with the conservative 
party. The spectacle of "La Violencia" and perceived affronts of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 
led the church hierarchy to endorse his overthrow and the subsequent inauguration of the 
National Front. 
According to some analysts, the low profile of the church in Colombian life is 
due to is inability to behave as a monolithic and homogenous body.60 It is necessary to 
differentiate between the diocesan clergy and the religious clergy, which positions tend to 
be opposed very frequently. Even in the bishopric itself there are hierarchies who belong 
to pre-modem sectors, while others are modem-conservatives and still others are 
progress-conservatives, some of which are close to liberationist sectors of the clergy. 
S. Workers and The Labor Movement 
In the modern world, unions are social phenomena with legal status. In 
Colombia, despite various worker mobilizations throughout its history, there was never 
an assimiliation of organized labor into the national political culture. The unions have 
been criticized by analysts for their inability to develop effective ·epresentation for the 
Colombian worker.61 They are usually recognized, but their legal, illegal, and political 
obstacles have been greater. 
bO Gonzales, Fernan, "La Iglesia Jerarquica", in A/ Fila del Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, ed., 
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The history of militant confrontation in the Colombian labor movements is not 
very long. The main exception was in 1920, when Colombia experienced sustained, 
violent labor revolts, including strikes against the United Fruit Company. In addition to 
being moderate, fragmented, and closely allied with the traditional parties or the Roman 
Catholic Church, the labor movement never accounted for more than one-third of the 
organized labor force, which itself represented only about one-fifth of the total labor 
force. 
In the present, analysts consider that the labor movement is increasing its 
dynamism and transforming its political self-image.62 Fragmented not long ago between 
bipartisan and revolutionary organizations, there now exist alliances across union 
boundaries. 
Analysis of economic indicators shows that there has been a clear economic 
reactivation though the consequences to labor are still not clear since 1986 . It seems that 
this reactivation implies an important decrease in unemployment, due to the fact that 
more work is being made available. Also, the proportion of workers earning less than the 
minimum salary has a diminishing tendency, and there are more workers covered by the 
minimum salary, and annual adjustments for inflation (see Table I). However, the real 
salary of private employees has been declining, and in 1987 the accumulated reduction 
amounted to J 0.2%.63 Government salaries have been somewhat more stable. 
Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, ed., Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 275. 
b] !bid, p. 278. 
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TABLE I. MINIMUM SALARY ANNUAL NEGOTIAnON PROCESS. 
Year of Year Govemrnent Proposal Proposal Inflation Decided Type of 
negotiation increase proposals economic Unions rate Adjustment Decision 
is (*) groups(**) year 
effective 
1984 1985 16-17% N.P. +26% 18.3% 20% Concert 
1985 1986 24% 22% 30% 22.7% 24% Concert 
1986 1987 17% N.P. 30% 20.5% 22% Concert 
1987 1988 22% 24.5% 26% 24.0% 25% No Concert 
1988 1989 26.5% N.l 33% 28.12% 27% No Concert 
1989 1990 19% N.l. 26.12% 26% No Concert 
Source : Records National Council for labor and salaries. 
(*)Final proposal. In 1985 was an average from Union proposal and inflation rate. 
(**) N.P.= No proposal 
N.l. =No information, due to private characteristics of sessions. 
There are also continuing problems related to employee benefits. First, social 
security only covers 30% of the workers, and has finance and administrative problems. 64 
Second, problems of noncompliance with labor laws continue to be widesprr'ld (see 
Table II). Third, subcontracts and temporary jobs are considered a threat to job security, 
and are considered by the unions method of avoiding payment of employee benefits. 
Fourth, the legal and political limitations of the unions, and their concentration m 
medium and big industries, limits their impact in moments of negotiation. 
&• Botero, Recio, "Problem'- Laborales y Reestructuraci6n del Sindicalismo", in A/ Fifo del 










TABLE II. COMPUANCE AND INFRACTION OF LABOR REGULATIONS IN 
ORGANIZATIONS VISITED BY THE MINISTRY OF WORK. 
Organizations Organizations Organizations that Number of Average 
visited(#) that comply violate at least 1 infringed norms 
norm 
1,414 206 (14.6%) 1,208 (85.4%) 4,3n 3.62 
3,450 542 (15.7%) 2,908 (84.3%) 9,963 3.42 
3,325 153 (4.6%0 3,172 (95.4%) 11,443 3.6 
4,263 145 (3.4%0 4,118 (96.6%) 18,141 4.4 
2,386 153 (6.5%) 2,233 (93.5%) 7,445 3.33 
2,695 957 (35.5%) 1,738 (64.5%) 9,876 5.68 
1,262 604 (47.9%) 658 (52.1%) 3,786 5.75 
Source: Ministry of Work. Planning office, pamphlets 28 to 39. 
There is no accurate data regarding the distribution of the labor force in unions, 
but the approximate proportions are: CUT ( Corporaci6n Unitaria de Trabajadores) 65%, 
CTDC (Confederaci6n de Trabajadores Democraticos) 20%, CGT (Corporaci6n general 
de Trabajadores) 6%, CTC (Corporaci6n de Trabajadores Colombianos) 4%, and 
Independent unions, 5%. However, in 1988, only an estimated 12% of Colombia's 
economically active population was unionized (see Figure 2).65 
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Despite the small percentage of union membership, for several observers, it is 
clear that there is no "labor peace" in Colombia. This is probably due to the fact that the 
membership of unions is so small that it is difficult to achieve recognition, much less 
response to demands, through negotiation. Consequently, the few voices that are raised 
in support of labor issues are always loud, and sometimes agitate for violence. Even so, 
there has been little improvement in worker's welfare. There is a visible social and labor 
unrest, because of the accumulation of problems, postponement of solutions, and the Jack 
of a modem policy for management-labor relations. The last ten years have been replete 
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with strikes in the banana, banking, cement, public services, telecommunications, and 
other industries. The unions have no official connections with the guerrillas. However, 
some union members voluntarily help insurgents, and share their philosophies. 
Various guerrilla groups have taken advantage of sympathizers among the labor 
unions to stage terrorists attacks in conjunction with union events such as strikes. While 
such terrorist activity occurs without the official authorization or endorsement of the 
union leadership, right-wing extremists have assassinated union leaders in revenge for 
such attacks. 
Recently, demands from the labor union have included protection for its leaders, 
and the more traditional focus of cost-of-living adjustments for wages. 
6. The Rural Population 
In Colombia, the decade of the 1980s was characterized by extensive popular 
protest. The rebirth of rural belligerency, contrasted the calmness experienced in the 
1970s. Several rural organizations organized marches to the cities to demand reform (see 
Table III). Large landowners wanted more favorable conditions for their expansion: 
small land-owners asked for defense of their position in the market; and peasants without 
land wanted their own parcels. Even though their demands were different, in general all 
converged on the defense and promotion of agriculture in rural areas. Through the years, 
the system forced them to massive protests demanding direct negotiations on problems 
areas. 
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TABLE Ill. DIFFERENT AGRARIAN MOBILIZATIONS 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) TOTALS 
Claims Specific rural Salaries Demand for Protests Combination 
for land problems and work Infrastructure against (D) and (E) 
conditions repression 
1979 . - - - - - -
1980 1 2 - - 1 - 4 
1981 1 2 - 1 - - 4 
1982 - 1 - 1 1 - 3 
1983 3 6 - 1 - 3 13 
1984 10 4 - 1 4 1 20 
1985 12 4 1 9 4 7 37 
1986 10 4 - 4 5 10 33 
1987 28 2 2 12 7 19 70 
1988 3 2 - 7 3 11 26 
TOTAL 68 27 3 36 25 51 210 
Figure 3. Agrarian Mobilizations, 1979-1988. 
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The evolution of this situation parallels the failure of the Nationa1. Front. When 
it bega.& in 1958, more than the half of the Colombian population was in the rural areas. 
Because they were the principal victims of the violence, it was expected that the 
traditional parties would give them priority. But the National Front was incapable of 
implementing the shortened "Law of Agrarian Reform" approved in 1961. Beginning the 
1970s, some of the rural population allied with guerrilla groups, to seize land and force a 
marginal redistribution; but this activity was actively repressed, and there was a 
dismantling of any legal framework for reform. Only coffee growers emerged with any 
measure of support. Other programs, such as DRI (Rural Integrated Development) have 
had moderate success. 
Even under adverse conditions, the rural population showed an enormous 
capacity for resistance. Today, as in 1960, around 1.3 miHion rural families use one third 
of the useful agricultural land of the country. 66 Even though the absolute amount of rural 
inhabitants stays the same, migration to the cities has changed the proportions of the 
country's population-- from 40% urban population in the 1950s to 70% in the 1980s.b7 
Also, traditional rural farming was replaced by larger commercial operations at a rate that 
reduced it's proportion of agricultural production from two thirds in the 1970s to less than 
one third in the 1980s. This was not merely an effect of differential efficiency: in large 
h& Comite lnteramericano para el Desarrollo Agrc.pecuario (CIDA), Colombia: Tenencia de ld 
Tierra y Desarrollo Socioeconomico de/Sector Agropecuarro, Washington, 1966, pp. 72, 116, 133. 
67 Bagley, Bruce, "The Society and its Environment", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, 
Dennis, ed.,Washimgton, 1988, p. 96. 
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measure it is the result of policies and financing which favor production technology over 
traditional rural agriculture. 
In addition to demands for land, markets, health, education and other services, 
Colombian rural mobilizations have uniformly pressed for more political democracy to 
the rural areas. Over the years, they have developed a capacity to organize and secure 
changes in policy.68 This peaceful solution became more useful than supporting guerrillas 
which only brought violent consequences. This shift in the perceived costs and benefits 
of the two approaches caused the great · r:ajority of "campesinos", prefer to be united and 
look for dialogue with the government to achieve solutions to their problems. However, 
even with this power, the rural presence in the national political arena is still weak. 
7. The Civic Movements 
Since 1957, strikes and the number of civic protests in Colombia have increased. 
The "national strike" of that year and the Pinilla dictatorship showed the potential of this 
method of expressing dissatisfaction. The populations of smaller Colombian towns were 
quick to learn the power of paralysis, employing civic strikes, which were intended to 
t-ring all activity m a town or district to a standstill, to highlight their concerns and 
demand social services. 
From 1958 to 1966 there were 16 civic strikes. In the government of Lleras 
Restrepo ( 19"6-1970), there were no strikes. In the next I 0 years, from 1971 to 1981, 
urban protest grew: there were 138 civic sirikes, averaging more than 13 per year. Of 
.. Zamosc, leon, 'l.i Campesinado y las Perspectivas para Ia Democracia Rural". in AI Fila del 
Caos. Buitrago. Francis<"o, ed .. Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 368. 
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those strikes, two were national: in 1977 and 1981. From 1982 to 1989, there were 218 
strikes, averaging more than 30 per year.69 
The increase in mobilization and social protests goes together with another 
phenomenon: the emergence of national meetings of different popula.;.- organizations, and 
the formation of civic movements and regional political movements. For example, in 
1979 a Christian group (CEB) was formed; in 1982 an Indian movement (ONIC); in 1983 
several groups joined in the National Coordinator of Civic Movements (CNMC). In 
1985, a group for popular housing (CONA VIP) was created; and the second meeting of 
the CNMC was held. 70 
Even though the civic movements were in the social arena, they helped to create 
regional political movements. Independent from the traditional parties, these movements 
tried to bring to social protest the political expression it previously lacked. This 
phenomenon marks a historic break with the traditional dependence of most of the 
groups on the traditional political parties, and gives them a source of unity and power. 
By 1987, thirteen of these groups operated nation-wide. 
The main motivations of these movements are: 71 
• Demand for Infrastructure -- from this perspective, civic protest is linked to a 
central motive; the dissatisfaction of large social sectors with low quality, high cost, 
"" Restrepo, luis,"Movimientos Civicos en Ia Decada de los Ochentas", in A/ Filo del Caos. 
Buitrago, Francisco, ed., Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 383. 
70 Ibid, p. 384. 
11 Henao, Juana, El Movimiento Civico en Colombia, University of Antioquia, 1989. pp. 
47-50. 
75 
or the complete lack of public services, particularly water, energy, sewing, 
communications, fuels, trash collection, and roads. 
• Unequal Development of the Regions -- due to the concentration of investment, 
production capacity, and work force in certain regions. The cities are better off 
than the rural areas, and some cities are more developed than others. 
• The Neoliberal Model: since 1970, the leading economic sectors are looking for a 
bigger role in the world market. This benefits the economy, but social investment 
is reduced in favor of capital investments. 
• Macroeconomic Policies: In times of economic crisis, the capacity of the 
government to respond to the demands of the people is reduced. Attempts to solve 
the economic problems can cause other problems. For example, subsidies and 
government expenditures are reduced; the tariffs are increased. 
• Centralization: The centralization of the state contributes to the municipal crisis. 
Resources go to the state to the detriment of the local revenues. The tendency is to 
determine allocations in accordance with the population, but this is not enough and 
the small towns are at a clea· Hsadvantage. 
• Right to Life -- this new motive has been taken by the civic movements and 
represents their desire to live free of violence. 
Between 1987 and 1988 there was a fleeting convergence between social and 
guerrilla movements. This was initiated by the guerrillas, who were looking for new 
areas of operations and seeking to end their political isolation. 72 This forced generated an 
Restrepo, luis,"Movimientos Civicos en Ia Decada de los Ochentas", in AI Filo del Caos, 
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increase in social mobilizations, but the level of fighting did not correspond to any 
development of the groups, or increase in their power. 
Since 1988 tensions have appeared between the original activists of the civic 
movements, who were loyal to the basic aspirations of social welfare, and representatives 
of subversive organizations who had infiltrated the movements as a means of increasing 
their power. The groups found themselves involved in projects which were not their own, 
and engaged in conflicts for which they were not prepared and in· which they were not 
even inte.-ested. Here began the divisions and disintegration of the coordinators. In 
October 1987 a new national strike was organized, but it was unsuccessful, as the people 
were indifferent. Only a few of these movements maintained their autonomy and 
managed the conversion to a regional political organization with some success. 
8. Bandits and Narcotics Traffickers 
Throughout Colombian history, periods of political violence have been 
accompanied by increases in the level of general violence and banditry. The Colombian 
bandit has consistently pursued personal wealth in a variety of forms, from food and 
cattle to gold, cash, and modem consumer products and automobiles. His stake in 
political violence is ·defined by the opportunity to take violent action in pursuit of 
personal goals without fear of legal consequences. This opportunity is present every time 
political violence occurs, and is usually indistinguishable in an atmosphere of generalized 
violence. The bandit has evolved throughout Colombian history, yet one of his more 
modem manifestations is made unique by the scale of the personal benefit derived. 
--------·---------------
Buitrago, Francisco, ed., Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 401. 
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The Colombian narcotics trafficker is a stakeholder in insurgency by virtue of 
the fact that he is either ally or enemy of the guerrilla. The Colombian drug cartels 
represent some of the most powerful and unmerciful enemies of the country. Although 
Colombia, a country with 30 million inhabitants, is relatively a small producer of coca, 
the Cartels control 80% or more of the world traffic in cocaine, with an annual estimated 
income between $2 and $4 billion US dollars. 73 The money produced is an obvious factor 
that in generating instability in the legal institutions. For many people it is clear that the 
drug lords are interested in controlling the traditional elites (through intimidation and 
corruption), which creates a serious threat to the country's democratic institutions. 
The relationship between drug traffickers and subversion is varied and complex. 
On one side, there is evidence that the cartels have supported right wing private militias, 
to control the rural areas through the development of "dirty wars" against the guerrillas 
and their followers. The result has been extreme violence in some areas of the 
Magdalena Valley and the eastern plains, putting in jeopardy the ability of the state to 
protect human rights and introduce development programs. 
This war originated when the narcotics traffickers began to buy land in areas of 
guerrilla influence, and were subjected to guerrilla extortion and kidnapping. Because of 
the inability of the legal authority to fully protect them, and using the finance capacity of 
their illegal business, they joined with other people in the areas to create private militias 
to "clean the area" and protect them against the guerrillas. This partnership generated 
71 Bagley, Bruce, "Narcotrafico: Colombia Asediada," in AI Filo del Caos, Buitrago, F., ed., 
Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1991, p. 445. 
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self-defense groups such as MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores - Death to Kidnappers) in 
Puerto Boyaca, which was responsible for several massacres in the middle Magdalena. In 
1984, the ACDEGAM (Association of Farmers and Cattlemen of the Middle Magdalena), 
who coordinated some of these self-defense groups, and also engaged in other civic and 
even political activities. The association consolidated its control of the Liberal party in 
an area not long ago controlled by communists, and created an illegal military school to 
train its members. 74 
Ironically, although it is evident that narcotics trafficking has impeded the 
development of rural reforms made by the state, the drug business also generates work 
and improves the income of thousands of rural people. The business has also responded 
to local demands for infrastructure, building schools and low income housing. The 
recipients of such gifts generally become loyal allies of the drug lords. 
At the same time, the guerrilla has recognized the potential of the business, and 
has increased participation in the farming and trafficking of cocaine. This is especially 
true of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (F ARC). At the beginning of the 
1980s, some guerrilla groups gave protected to cartel areas, exchanging the protection for 
money and weapons. However, in the past few years, the cooperation seems to have 
ended, and now both sustain a war to control the land and people of coca farming and 
refining areas. 
'
4 Bagley, Bruce, "Narcotrafico: Colombia Asediada" in AI Filo del Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, 
ed., Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogota, 1991, p. 455. 
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C. SUMMARY 
By the late 1980s, all of the stakeholders in insurgency had a common 
characteristic: the cost of continuing political violence had become greater than the 
benefits to be obtained. For the political parties, the cost-benefit approach meant that 
political violence impeded their access to potential voters, and that there was political 
opportunity in bringing the guerrilla membership back to national life. The military had 
realized that continued focus on internal security was at the expense ')f external security 
considerations, and that the continual oscillation between dialog and violence was an end 
game that held no advantage. Industry was aware that further development, which 
capitalists translated into further profit, was contingent on a permanent solution to 
political violence directed against commercial enterprise. The Catholic Church, 
struggling to reconcile the present social demands of modernization to the historical 
requirements of tradition, was willing to lend its voice to the plea for an end to violence. 
The demands of labor, rural populations, and the various civic movements were 
increasingly seen to be more readily achievable at lower cost through political, rather than 
politically violent, means. The bandit now must confront the possibility of having to 
operate in a much more open environment, and must necessarily reevaluate the benefit to 
be derived from continued violent action. The narcotics trafficker is also reviewing the 
means available to maintain the level of prosperity. Manual Marulanda Velez, however, 
remained unconvinced that the violent pursuit of political objectives in Colombia should 
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be made a thing of the past. In early 1987, in lived in an "inhospitable and difficult to 
approach hamlet" in the department of Meta, and vowed to continue the struggle. 
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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The present chapter intent to present some of the relations between the economy 
and the political violence. For this purpose, the first part of the chapter is an effort to 
explain with the help of economic theories, some of the causes of the insurgency. The 
second part will analyze the Colombian macroeconomic performance and policies, to see 
their relations with this violence. This is followed by a section on finance methods of the 
various guerrilla groups, and the chapter concludes with an examination of the economic 
costs of political violence. 
A. ECONOMY AND POLITICS 
Wilber Albert Chaffee, states that every day the relationship between economics 
and political change becomes more obvious.7s Studies tie economics and politics together 
in a framework of political economy that involves important questions about resource 
allocation. 
The following analysis will try to discuss in general terms, the economic theory of 
public goods, and their intimate connection to politics. 76 The concept of politicians as 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will be developed and contrasted with the motives of 
7~ Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Pub!ishers, 
1992, p. 1. 
76 Buchanan, james M., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand McNally, Chicago, 
1968, p. 9. 
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other people who decide to involve themselves in politics. The concept is similar to that 
of the business entrepreneur, but involves the production and distribution of public goods. 
Additionally, the concept of competition for position and profit among different 
politicians and parties is discussed. Finally, the motives of individuals in politics will be 
considered -- specifically the reasons behind their decision to join a revolution, support an 
incumbent government, or stay neutral. This section is intended to relate political culture 
political economic theory, viewing politics as a form of economics, rather than using 
economic reasoning to understand politics. 
1. Political Economy 
Among the social scientific theories currently in use, there is a shared central 
assumption: Human behavior is rational, in that a person can order a complete 
(exhaustive) list of preferences in such a way as to maximize his or her own self interest 
and, if given a choice, will choose that preference which maximizes his gains. 
Furthermore, a rational person will obtain as much of his preferred choice as he can. 77 
Based on the prior assumption, James Buchanan stated the following: 78 
Political science, then, becomes a study of how individuals make political 
choices, and what the logical consequences of those choices are. Political behavior 
parallels economic behavior in terms of the exchange of goods and services in 
return for compensation. The differences between economics and politics lie in the 
types of goods and services and of the medium and method of compensation. In 
general, economic studies markets, and the rroduction and supply of private goods; 
---·---------- ----------- -------- ------- -- - ------- - ---
71 Chaffee, Wilber Albert,- The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 4. 
71 Buchanan, james M., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand McNally, Chicago, 
1968, p. 9. Note: Buchanan represents the "rational choice" school of thought in political science. 
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while politics studies the production, supply, and payment for collective or public 
goods. 
2. Collective Goods 
Political competition, including the use of violence, is intimately tied to the 
question of demand and supply of collective goods. Collective goods are those goods 
which, if supplied to one individual, cannot be withheld from all other individuals within 
a society79 • Since a collective good once supplied to one person is freely available to all, 
there is no incentive to pay for the good, creating what is called the "free-rider" problem. 
The mechanisrr. used by governments to eliminate this problem is taxation. 
Conceptuall::, "politics began when a community of individuals decided to demand goods 
and services publicly through governmental/political processes, rather than privately, 
precisely because the bilateral exchanges facilitated by market arrangements are 
insufficiently inclusive. "80 
3. Political Entrepreneurship 
The political entrepreneur is a person or organized group of persons who seek 
profit from the production and supply of public goods.81 To obtain profit, the 
entrepreneur, after determining the level of demand required to secure the public good, 
will supply that good to the consumers for less in production costs than he can collect 
back in the form of revenues. An excellent example of the political entrepreneur in Latin 
7
" Samuelson, Paul, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure", Review of Economics and 
Statistics 1137, 1955, pp. 387-389. 
811 Buchanan, James M., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand McNally, Chicago, 




America is the "cacique" (boss), who uses his leadership position to advance his own 
financial interests. Holding this position is contingent on his ability to supply public 
goods to his community in exchange for votes ( clientelism), and to repress competitors 
who would seek to replace him. In Colombia another sign of political entrepreneurship, 
is the close relationship between the economic and political elites. During the first part of 
this century, merchants and agriculturist dominated the politics and lead the country 
according to their interests, and benefiting from public funds. 
Other motivations considered by W.A. Chaffee include: security resulting in 
choices that heighten the probability of remaining in office; ambition -- the desire to go to 
the top of the political ladder; and the power and prestige associated with the membership 
in office-- useful for social mobility. 
So far, entrepreneurship and economic gain have been used descriptively in the 
analysis of political behavior. A further step is to link these concepts to a theory of 
politics. A majo. advance in this direction was made by Merle Kling, with the hypothesis 
that: 
political instability in much of Latin America has its basis in economic 
dominance, which closes off the opportunity for personal social advancement 
through economic activity and results in a pursuit of political office as a means of 
securing prestige, profit and power. 82 
One of the examples used by Chaffee is the frustration of university graduates 
who can not be absorbed by the economy. Their opportunities for subsequent economic 
81 Kling, Merle, Towards a theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America, Western 
Political, 1956, pp. 21-35. 
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advancement are limited, prompting many in this group to join leftist movements against 
the economic and politic elites. 
In another approach, Hugh J Aitken concludes that 
entrepreneurship is a characteristic of all organized human activity ... you 
cannot talk about organization without talking about entrepreneurship as one aspect 
ofit.83 
The importance of this concept lies in its value in constructing an explanation of 
revolution or the lack of revolution. After examining a number of hypothesis about 
revolution, D.E.H. Russell noted that none shows why there had not been a revolution in 
South Africa, prior to the end of apartheid. He concluded that organization is the key, 
since the South African regime makes it virtually impossible for Africans to 
organize themselves into a revolutionary force, the organization thesis comes to be 
inseparable from the elitist thesis in this particular situation. 84 
In a similar analysis of violence in Latin America, Martin Needler puts it 
simply: "the masses do not arise; they are aroused. "85 In Columbia, the degree to which 
the government allows revolutionary groups to organize determines the level that these 
movements can reach. The degree of power of the Colombian guerrilla organizations, has 
depended on the level ofpermisaivity of the government through history. During periods 
of strong military action against the guerrillas, the groups have seen their structures 
diminished. Accordingly, when the political elites allow them to function, restricting 
81 Aitken, Hughe, The Future of Entrepreneurial Research: Explorations in Entrepreneurial 
History, Harvard University, 1963, p. 6. 
84 Russell, D.E.H., Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force, Academic Press, New York, 1974, 
p. 54. Note: Since Russell wrote, the situation in South Africa has changed dramatically, in part as a 
result of the development of unions and other coordinating organizations. 
as Needler, Martin C., Political Development in Latin America, Random House, New York, 
1968, p. 56. 
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official military actions, the guerrilla groups reorganize and strengthen their structures. 
Groups such as the F ARC had even formed so called "independent republics" in the areas 
of Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, Pato and Guayabero. These were destroyed during the 
Valencia administration in 1964. Later, the FARC were allowed to keep for several years 
another refuge in "Casa Verde" in the "La Uribe" Depaitment of Meta, which served as 
center of operations and training, and was subsequently destroyed in December 1990. 
According to Chaffee, a political entrepreneur able to organize collective action 
is the necessary catalyst for revolution. As discussed previously, individual charisma has 
always been one of the pillars of Colombian politics. This may in part, explain the 
proliferation of insurgent movements that have occurred in its history. 
4. Political Competition 
By combining the profit maximizing assumption of political entrepreneurship 
with microeconomic models of profit levels resulting from varying forms of economic 
competition, a theory of political competition can be developed. Political competition, as 
a form of economic behavior, is analogous to economic competition. 86 
Insurrections occur when an incumbent government has monopolistic control 
over the supply of collective goods in a polity and represses the entry of alternative offers 
to supply these goods. In order to compete with a monopolistic incumbent, a prospective 
competitor must break the political monopoly. 87 The situation becomes a duopolistic 
86 Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 54. 
87 North, Douglas C., Structure and Change in Economic History, W.W. Norton, New Yv •. <, 
1981, p. 27. 
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political competition in which the conflict is continued until one of the two competitors is 
eliminated from the polity. The winning competitor then has monopolistic political 
control. This series of situations results in a cycle of competitive type of politics, as 
shown in Figure 4. 
~oNOPo~ 
3. The Winning Y 
Competitor 
1. The Incumbent 
._ Government 
2. The Incumbent Government Plus 
The Opposition 
Figure 4. Cycle of Competitive Politics. 
An example of this competitive sequence in Colombia is seen in the power 
struggle between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Even though there were some 
instances of collaboration, when interests were opposed, one party became the opposition 
seeking to replace the party in power. During the government of Laureano Gomez, his 
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pressure to keep the monopoly of the conservative party by force ultimately lead to a 
coalition of the opposition with the armed forces, a coup, and the installation of the 
government of Rojas Pinilla in 1953. 
Political competition is also defined as the rivalry between two or more political 
entrepreneurs, each of whom wants the right to supply a package of collective goods to a 
society. There are several classes of collective goods.88 
• One type is the pure c ~llective good of replacing an incumbent leader. This is a 
nondivisible, nonexclusionary good that can only be supplied in one quantity -- the 
incumbent is either replaced or not replaced. 
• Other collective goods can be supplied in continuous quantities hut are 
non-exclusively supplied. An example of this type of collective good is national 
defense, which can be supplied at different levels. 
• Similarly there are varying levels of political and economic freedom; the lifting of 
repression is often a collective good offered by the leader of a revolution. 
• Other goods are collectively supplied on an individual basis, such as land reform, 
where large pieces of land are divided up for the personal use of those who work 
the land. This is essentially the supply of private goods on a collective basis. The 
original private character of the good is then the reason for the failure of this kind 
of program in Colombia. Unless the incentives for the owners are likewise good, 
they will use political pressures to stop agrarian reform. The land issue was also a 
88 Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, pp. 58-60. 
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motivator for insurgency when colonists in the 1960s allied with the guerrilla 
groups in order to protect their lands from expropriation by the government, after 
pressures by large land owners claiming ownership of those lands. 
• Collective goods that are limited to one group, but collectively supplied to 
members of that group, are another type. An illustration of this situation is 
presented by the ELN, who argue that natural resources belong to the Colombian 
people and can not be sold to foreign companies. This is their main justification for 
attacking installations in the oil and mining industries. 
Discontent is a necessary condition for revolution. 89 Discontent can be expressed 
as a demand, as a want. If the discontent is an aggregated demand for a change in the 
supply of collective goods, and if the demand is great enough, then the potential exists for 
making a profit by supplying those goods. But discontent is not a sufficient condition for 
revolution. If it were, then the prediction of revolution and political violence would be 
simpler. An example in the Caribbean is Haiti. Even though the vast majority of the 
populace lives on a marginal subsistence level, and the nation has the lowest national 
average per capita income in Latin America, the extreme oppression of the government 
has so far avoided a revolution. 90 
Another area for political competition is a sustained duopoly. This is simply 
two-party competition between suppliers, each of which recognizes that its actions have a 
significant impact on the supply of a commodity. This is the simplest form of political or 
89 Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The economics of violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 60. 
90 Ibid, p. 60. 
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economic competition. In the political arena, such competition can be expressed in a 
number of ways: two-partied electoral systems, civil wars, coups d'etat, and revolution. 
In the case of political duopoly, three forms of competition result: 
• competition within a legal framework that limits yet divides profits between the 
competitors; 
• competition in which the major supplier of collective goods allows a competitor as 
the least expensive form of maintaining near-monopoly profits, then allowing 
competition may be less costly than repression; 
• violence in which competition is cutthroat, and has as it's objective the elimination 
of competition. 
The first form exists when there is a set of norms established by law and 
accepted by the competitors. The calculation by political entrepreneurs that profit can be 
best maximized by allowing political competition results in collusion. Competition can 
remain profitable only if there is some form of collusion, either explicit or implicit. 
Collusion guarantees the winner of a political competition a definite term in office, so 
that the changing offers of collective goods packages, do not tum an incumbent out of 
office every time a more valuable offer of political good is made. This prevents turning 
the leadership of government into a profitless enterprise, since it ensures a winning 
political entrepreneur sufficient time in office to make a profit, and helps to make those 
profits long term rather than short term. 
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One of the most dramatic examples of contractual collusion with the specific 
purpose of preventing profit loss by cutthroat political competition can be seen in the case 
of Colombia's National Front.91 Even though the majority was represented in both parties, 
small groups felt that the duopoly actually was a monopoly of the traditional parties. A 
situation with these characteristics existed when the ANAPO of Rojas Pinilla tried in 
1970 to break that monopoly with public support. The narrow margin of votes generated 
accusations of fraud in some sectors, and were, in large measure, responsible for the 
formation of the revolutionary movement M-19. Some analysts think that the National 
Front solved the problem of institutionalized political violence between Liberals and 
Conservatives, but political violence was generated when the minority lost the supply of 
some collective goods, due to the lack of incentive for the traditional parties to distribute 
them, once the opposition had been reduced. 92 
5. The Institutionalization of Political Entrepreneurship 
The institutionalization of political competition, which is tied to political 
stability, is referred as "the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, 
complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of different 
groups and to promote social and economic change. "93 One form of institutionalization of 
political competition is the creation of institutions of bureaucracy and modes of behavior 
that promote legalized competition. This development increases the cost of illegal 
q, Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 66. 
q 2 Thoumi, Francisco E.,"Politicas Econ6micas ante los Desafios del Desarrollo " , in A/ Filo del 
Caos, Buitrago, Francisco, Ed., Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 1991, p. 126. 
91 Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, Princeton Press, 1988, p. 266. 
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violence, removes some of the profit taking of political competitors, and promotes 
cooperative competition. Institutionalization increases the government's ability to make 
continuing decisions about the production and supply of public goods in such a way that 
political entrepreneurs are limited in the profit they can extract; hence a strong, organized, 
and established bureaucracy with a non-political civil service limits the value, or profit, 
that can be gained through political competition by violence. 
As important as governmental institutionalization is, a second form of 
institutionalization may be more important in the elimination of political competition 
through violence: the institutionalization of political entreprene';li'Ship. Economically, 
this results in an exchange of short-term profits for long term gain, increasing the value of 
benefits supplied to the consumer and reducing the demand for a change of supplier. 
Politically, institutionalization means the shift of political entrepreneurship from the 
personal leadership of an innovative, risk-taking individual, to a collective, 
bureaucratized management group; an institutionalized political party. Competition is 
then between political parties rather than between candidates, increasing the possibility of 
democratic stability and decreasing the likelihood of revolution. These concepts can be 
formalized into the following hypothesis and corollaries: 94 
• Institutionalized political entrepreneurship provides less costly channels for 
ambitious politicians to rise within the ~litical arena, rather than by revolution. 
94 Chaffee, Wilber Albert, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 89. 
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• Institutionalization rotates politicians out of the system, opening up positions for 
younger politicians. 
• More of the polity's demands are met through increased units of production when 
profit maximization is long tenn. 
Proof that institutionalization increases the likelihood of maintaining a 
democratic system is the observed political stability of Colombia for more than 35 years. 
In Colombia, the traditional parties have existed for over one hundred years. Today, as a 
result of the constitution of .l 991, minorities are allowed to participate and obtain gains 
from the system in pacific ways. The participation of reincorporated members of the 
guerrillas and minorities, such as the Indians, strengthens the Colombian democratic 
system. 
6. Calculus of Revolutionary Participants 
The rational person seeks to maximize his or her utility. If the person is a 
political entrepreneur, he or she seeks to maximize profit from the production and supply 
of collective goods. This section considers the rationelity of individuals in an 
insurrectory situation, who must calculate what actions will most maximize their utility, 
or will benefit them most, in deciding whether to revolt or not. 95 
The cost for an individual to join a revolt is very high, including his or her 
property, liberty, or even life. To make ~e choice, the individual calculates what 
personal utility he can expect from each of the competitors (government or guerrillas), 
95 Chaffee, Wilber Alben, The Economics of Violence in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, 
1992, p. 1 08. 
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what the cost would be of supporting each of them, and, discounting the costs of expected 
utility, supports the competitor whose programs offer him the most. If the cost exceeds 
the utility, the individual will abstain from giving support to one of the competitors. 
Because the costs are very high, rationality implies that the mdividual with 
political motives and a perceived fair standard ofliving will exhaust legal channels before 
resorting to violence. Examples of this situation are the civic movements in Colombia; 
which have found in protests an effective means of gaining attention for their demands. 
With the opening of the democratic system, other stakeholders of polity have found more 
effective channels to express their problems and obtain collective goods than by pursuing 
revolution. This is why the guerrillas have been loosing support over the years. When 
the government listens more to social claims and tries to solve problems, the people find 
it cheaper to obtain their needs through legal channels, especially if the government is 
firm in demanding non-violent action from those who expect change, and quick to 
respond in kind to the actions of those who choose a non-peaceful method of expressing 
their demands. However, there are still groups for which the benefits of revolution are 
greater than the costs. Some social problems remain unchanged, and affected persons 
perceive advantage in the guerrilla movements. Even though the likelihood of guerrilla 
groups rising to political power decreases everyday, the financial gains obtained through 
kidnapping, extortion, illegal drugs, and attacks on the economy are enough incentive to 




detennination of perceived cost and benefit by increasing the coverage of social programs 
(benefit) and supporting military and legal action to counter the problem (cost). 
B. THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, this part will attempt to determine the 
relationship between macroeconomic policies and insurgency, and how this could lead to 
a general crisis. For that purpose, first will be made a rapid profile of the Colombian 
macroeconomic performance, to place the country in a frame of reference. Secondly, the 
relationship between violence in the country and the economy will be discussed. 
Colombia has been one of Latin America's few consistent economic performers 
during the debt crisis of the last decade. It is the only South American country without a 
single year of negative economic growth in 45 years. Curtailments in Public investment, 
as well as tight monetary and fiscal controls to reduce inflation, have been implemented 
in recent years with success. During the last decade, Colombian per capita income 
increased by 15%96• 
Despite political and drug-related violence, the country maintained growth and 
an essentially capitalist orientation. The government depends on entrepreneurial efforts 
and private capital (both foreign and domestic) as the sources of economic growth, and 
limits its domestic role to coordinating fiscal and monetary policies, providing for the 
public sector and infrastructure development, and establishing a political environment 
96 Hornbeck, J.F., "The Economy", in Colombia: a Country Study, Harantty, Dennis, 
Washington, 1988, p. 135. 
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conducive to investment and industrial development. Colombia's collective economic 
attributes define a middle-income developing country that has a strong and diverse 
resource base, as well as assorted production capabilities grounded in industry, 
manufacturing, agriculture, and various services. The present government and analysts 
predict that growth will continue, as will the reduction in inflation. The national 
unemployment rate for 1991 was 10%, and is presently under control, even falling in the 
big cities. 97 Other key economic and trade statistics at the beginning of the decade are 
presented in Tables IV, V, and VI. 
However, despite many positive aspects, other problems remained. First, despite 
improvement, Colombia continues to have a highly skewed distribution of income and a 
relatively low per capita income. Indeed. in the late 1980s, the economy appeared to 
become even more concentrated, with the rewards of production remaining 
predominantly m the hands of the minority. Second, inflation, though seemingly under 
control, remains high. The same is true of the unemployment rate. Finally, the infamous 
drug trade is affecting the economy, resulting in inflation and an underground economy. 
97 Colombian Economic Facts, Colombian Embassy, Washington, 1992. 
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TABLE IV. COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS. 
Gross Product (1991) $ 43.5 billion 
Per Capita Income (1991) $ 1,295 (a year) 
Total debt (1991) $ 17.5 billion 
Debt as a % of Gross Product 40.2% 
(1991) 
Merchandise Exports (1991) $ 7.28 billion 
Merchandise Imports (1991) $ 5.10 billion 
Trade Balance (1991) + $2.18 billion 
Major Exports (1990) Oil (27.5%), Coffee (19.7%), Coal (7.7%) 
Leading Export Markets (1990) US (45%), Germany (12.1%), Japan (5.3%) 
Major Imports (1990) Intermediate Goods (46.3%) 
Capital Goods (37.4%) 
Fuel & Lubricants (6.1%) 
Major Import Markets (1990) US (36.3%), Jape.. -',),Germany (7%) 
Labor Force (1990) Services (39%) 
Agriculture (29%), Manufacturing (14%) 
Source : The National Planning Department, DNP. 
TABLE V. OTHER COMPARATIVE INDICATORS 
1950 1991 
Life Expectancy (Yrs) 50 69 
Population Growth(%) 4 2 
Infant Mortality (per 1 000) 112 41 
Illiteracy(%) 40 10 
Population (Million) 10 32 
Urban Population (%) 30 70 
Electricity (kW I Capita) 20 285 
Source: The National Planning Department, DNP. 
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TABLE VI. ECONOMIC GROWTH (1980-1990) .AND INFLATION RATE 
(1983-1991). 
COUNTRY ECONOMIC GROWTH INFL.AnON RATE 
(1980-1990) (1983-1991) 
COLOMBIA 3.4 24 
CHILE 2.8 21 
BRAZIL 2.7 660 
PARAGUAY 1.9 25 
ECUADOR 1.9 44 
MEXICO 1.1 66 
VENEZUELA 0.7 30 
BOLIVIA 0 1,203 
ARGENTINA -0.5 946 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, CEPAL 
C. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLIC~8 
Considering the economic data, and how Colombia avoided a debt crisis, high 
inflation, and the low growth of other Latin American countries, it is possible to argue 
that the causes of insurgency are not related to the economic performance of the country. 
This is why solving insurrection is not simply a matter of macroeconomic adjustments. 
The Colombian crisis is basically institutional; the result of inefficient institutions 
unable to face social problems. When the economy of the country became bigger and 
complex, the intervention of the state also grew and became more complex. The state, 
however, did not adapt to its changing role by assuming more responsibility, and became 
progressively more inefficient. The state is therefore unable to perform basic services to 
-----------
qa Thoumi, Francisco E., "Politicas Econ6micas ante los Desafios del Desarrollo", in A/ Filo del 
Caos , Buitrago, Francisco, Ed., Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 1991, p. 127. 
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guarantee the physical security of the citizens, or the functioning of the legal system to 
· solve conflicts and protect basic human rights. 
Historically the country was controlled by an elite. The actions of these political 
leaders were not perceived by the great majority as measures designed to effect social 
welfare. The continuity in power of elites with several economic interests in common, 
pennitted an implicit agreement about the economic system. This agreement allowed the 
macroeconomic policies to be stable and independent from the election results. The 
economic debate had been managed professionally. Politicians have been more interested 
in the size of their fiscal allocations than in the social impacts of monetary or fiscal 
policies. Each administration has had its own development plan. The difterences, 
however, involve plans with more sectarian than ideological emphasi.:;_ 
The concentration of political power is related to economic dominion. Power had 
been reflected in the protection of economic revenues of some groups. as it was an 
important obstacle to possible economic reforms. 99 Important redistributive refonns, such 
as agrarian reform, urban reform and tax reform had been legally approved on several 
occasions, but these laws had been influenced by the affected groups, avoiding radical 
changes. These actions diminish the capacity of the state to respond to changes in the 
economic environment. 
The inability of the state to enforce the law is another source of economic 
instability. Much of the country's capital is beyond the control of the state. Even in legal 
-------·------
99 Kalmonovitz, Salomon, "Los Gremios Industriales ante Ia Crisis" in AI Filo del Caos, 
Buitrago, Francisco, Ed., Ediciones Tercer Mundo, Bogota, 1991, p. 193. 
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enterprises, there is a "partial legality" that enables minimization of costs. The rapid 
growth of the informal economy is accelerated by the narcotics boom, weakening the 
state and respect for legal authority. The crisis arises when the people observe the 
majority obtaining benefits by illegal means with low or no risk. Activities such as tax 
evasion, smuggling, contract violations, frauds, etc., are becoming more frequent. In this 
environment, the costs of establishing and operating a business are continually rising, 
because it is necessary to dedicate more income and resources to self protection. This 
situation causes economic retardation and discourages investment. 
D. GUERRILLA FINANCE 
In the last two decades, most people in Colombia have agreed on a need to reduce 
the social and political problems that create political violence. Even though some 
problems persist, there are clear efforts to create a better country; the new "business" 
orientation of guerrilla activity has made Colombians today more pesimistic about 
solving this problem peacefully. 
1. Areas of Guerrilla Economic: Inftuenc:e100 
The following paragraphs discuss several areas m which guerrilla groups 
maintain an economic influence. Figure S shows the areas discussed. 
100 Based on information taken from the weekly magazine Semana, edition 550, November 17, 
1992, pp. 32-36. 
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Uribe 
Figure 5. Areas of Guerrilla Economic Influence. 
11. Urabti 
Uraba is on the coast of the departments of Antioquia and Choco. This is an 
area devoted mainly to agriculture, and is famous for its cattle and bananas. The area has 
traditionally been controlled by the EPL. Since the reintegration of the EPL into society, 
the F ARC has tried to take control of Uraba. To achieve this objective, F ARC engaged 
in combat against the Armed Forces in the area, infiltrated the banana unions, and 
extorted the cattle ranchers and land owners. But, their most notorious actions involved a 
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bloody battle against the fonner members of the EPL who maintained political control. 
In 1993 and 1994, the area made international news, as a result of the massacre of dozens 
of EPL followers. 
• Members of the Astolfo Gonzalez' and Heroes of Uraba's fronts from the ELN 
operate in Antioquia's Uraba. The F ARC has th~c= fronts: 34th, 5th and 18th, 
which operate p.imarily in Cordoba. The number of guerrilla members in the area 
is close to 500. 
• Uraba has so far resisted the efforts of guerrilla groups. However, the lack of DAS 
(Administrative Department of Security) forces in the area; the fact that there is 
only one jail; and constant threats against justice officials combines to put the 
regions future in jeopardy. The army maintains the Voltigeros and Velez battalions 
in the area, and in 1994 the 17th brigade was created. Of the 3,500 military 
personnel present in 1992, approximately 1 ,400 were engaged in 
counter-insurgency activity. 
b. The Northeast 
This area of the country is in the Departments of Arauca, Northern Santander, 
Santander and the northern part of Casanare. A large portion of the country's oil and coal 
production is located in this area. The region also has some development in agriculture 
and the cattle industry. In this area guerrilla activity is intense. The oil and coal 
industries generate considerable amounts of money, a part of which has, in tum, been 
used by the guerrillas to finance their activities. The guerrillas have an influence at every 
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stage of oil production: adjudication, exploration, extraction, transportation and 
commercialization. 
It is known by the government that the guerrillas have sometimes pressured 
INCORA (Colombian Institute of the Agrarian Refonn) officials, to give land to guerrilla 
collaborators in key areas near oil production facilities and pipelines. The guerrillas have 
also worked to infiltrate the oil company unions that are active in the area. By 
intimidating civilian authorities, the guerrillas have also developed levels of control over 
the city councils, mayors and state offices, including the placement of collaborators in 
key positions. Curiously, even though the area is very important to the guerrillas, 
incidents involving combat are infrequent, demonstrating a high degree of sophistication 
in controlling the area through extortion and intimidation. In Santander, the "gasoline 
cartel" operates by, with help from the guerrillas, stealing fuel from pipelines to be sold to 
the public at a lower price. Control over the coal companies in the area is also very 
intense. This area without any doubt is essential for the ELN. 
• In the North-east operate the 1Oth, 45th, 12th, 20th, 23rd, and 24th fronts of the 
F ARC. The ELN operates the Domingo Lain Front, which is their biggest and 
most important. There are 3,000 guerrillas in the area (F ARC and ELN). 
• The anned forces in the area include the 5th and 1st Brigades, and some support 
troops from the 6th brigade. Arauca hosts Operative Command #2, and the oil 
areas also have a mobile brigade. There are more than 10,500 soldiers in the area, 
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including more than 2,000 who are professional soldiers that are specially trained to 
fight guerrillas. 
c. The Coct~ille-Heroill Trillngle 
This area, a traditional location for the processing coca leaves from Peru and 
Bolivia, has more recently been a location of opium poppy cultivation. The area is 
formed by portions of the departments of Valle, Cauca, Tolima, Huila, Caqueta, 
Putumayo and Nariiio. In this area the guerrillas watch and protect laboratories and 
cultivation areas used in the drug business. Besides this, they are promoting the 
cultivation of poppy through the distribution of seeds, training of fanners, and by being a 
link between producers and buyers. 
• The region has five fronts of the F ARC: the 29th, 8th, 13th, 21st and 6th. There is 
also some evidence of activities of the Manuel Vasquez Castano front of the ELN. 
The region has approximately 600 guerrilla members. 
• In certain areas of the triangle the state maintains a very low presence. However, 
the area has 7,500 members of the Armed Forces, from the 2nd, 6th and 9th 
brigades. 
d. Lll Uribe 
This is one of the poorest areas where the guerrilla have established 
operations. The guerrilla do not have an economic incentive in the area. The area has a 
hard geography, and its importance for the guerrilla is strategic. Indeed, this is the center 
of operations for the F ARC. The town of La Uribe was for two decades a kind of 
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"Independent Republic of the Guerrilla". The "Secretariado" (central command), and the 
staff and operative commands of the F ARC are all headquartered in La Uribe. On 
December 9, 1990, the government decided to let the arme<J forces take control of the 
area, which for political reasons had been previously left alone. The assault on "Casa 
Verde" -- housing the F ARC's high command -- restored military control over the area. 
• In La Uribe the fronts 44th, 7th and 26th of F ARC operate. The number of 
guerrilla members number the area is around 600. 
• The state introduced the Social Rehabilitation Plan in the area, and the army has a 
mobile brigade in constant operation. 
e. Northe11st Antioquill 
This is a gold producing region. However, the importance of the area to the 
guerrillas also marks the compulsory transit of oil and coal to the coast through the 
region. The guerrillas tried to control traffic on the Magdalena and Cauca rivers. The 
guerrillas in the area also control the gold industry. The extortion and "taxes" on gold 
production are an important source of finance. The transportation companies that carry 
oil and coal are also victims of guerrilla attacks. 
• In the area operate the 4th and 24th fronts of the F ARC, with 200 combatants. 
• The area is under the jurisdiction of the 4th and 14th brigades, along with support 
from the 1Oth brigade. The number of armed forces members is around 7 ,000. 
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2. Sources of Guerrilla Finance 
11. Th~ Co••unist Countries- Tu End oftu Cold W«r 
The communist support arrived to Colombia from Cuba after Castro seized 
power in 1959. Since the early 1960s, when Castro helped to establish the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), Cuba has supported Colombian guerrilla groups with training 
and, to a lesser degree, with small arms, equipment, and ammunition. In January 1966, 
Cuba held the Tri-Continental conference in Ia Havana, with the participation of the 
Soviet Union and China. In that conference were established the policies related with 
support to revolutionary efforts in Third World States101 .The support from Cuba increased 
after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in mid-1979. That support included political 
and military training, and logistical support especially in the form of guns and 
ammunition. The open support of Cuba to a failed M-19 attempt to launch rural 
insurgency led Colombia to break relations with that country in the early 1980s. In 1985, 
after the assault on the Justice Palace by the M-19, the government found that the guns 
used by the guerrillas on that occasion came from Nicaragua. 
However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the communism as a political 
option, Cuba and Nicaragua needed to take care of their own problems and practically 
ended direct support to the guerrillas (even though Castro and Ortega continued to 
support the idea of popular revolution). This is the reason why the guerrillas have 
101 Maullin, Richard, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, Rand Corporation, 1973, 
pp. 29-33. 
107 
changed through the 1980s. The failure of communism as a political system had left 
them without an ideological base with which attract people to their organization. 
Analyzing events, the leaders of the F ARC and the ELN, understood that it 
was necessary to change the incentives for people to join them. Conscious that a 
continuation of the activity centered in the poorest and most remote areas of the country 
were the mosc vulnerable and the least profitable, they decided to focus their actions in 
the richest areas102• 
b. The New Strt1tegy 
Even though they were already using other economic sources to support their 
activities, by the 1980s the guerrilla ftonts 103 increased their activities to get resources and 
moved from areas of cattle production, to oil, gold, coal and finally to coca (cocaine) and 
poppy (heroin) cultivating areas. This strategy permitted them to find sources of finance 
while at the same time generated an economic crisis and maintained a level of poverty, 
which could produce the necessary unhappiness in the people to drive them against the 
government. 
However, the development of this strategy has different characteristics in 
some cases. For example, guerrilla activity in banana cultivating areas grew at the same 
cadence of the region. Cattle ranching areas have also their own characteristics. Even 
before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, guerrilla groups struck out at cattle ranchers 
to finance their operations. After more than a decade of extortion and kidnapping , some 
101 Walker, Phyllis, "National Security", in Colombia a Country Study, Harantty, Dennis, ed., 
Washington, 1988, p. 268. 
103 Structural division of the guerrilla that is based on geographical area. 
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cattle ranchers have abandoned their haciendas altogether, and now this activity in that 
areas is minimal or non-existent. Ironically, the guerrilla groups in these areas have 
stopped targeting ranchers in order to avoid their total extinction, and the loss of this 
source of funding -- the guerrilla who in the past targeted the capitalist enterprise is today 
leaving it alone so that it can survive. 
The financial world of the guerrilla is still surrounded by mystery. However, 
in recent years, the government has tried to calculate earnings, and disclose them to the 
public. The financial data is based on intelligence information obtained through the 
collaboration of former guerrilla members, special agents, and documentation {including 
computer diskettes) captured from the guerrillas. In the last four years, through detailed 
analysis of the available information, the authorities have learned more about the 
financing methods of the F ARC and the ELN than in thirty years of military 
counter-insurgency campaigns. 104 The data is summarized in Table VII. 105 
c. F ARC Div~rsijic11tion 
The F ARC has reached a high degree of sophistication in its finances. Since 
the mid-l980s, a constant preoccupation in the guerrilla commander's summits has been 
to find ways of diversify their activities and sources of finance. 
The information obtained has permitted the authorities to develop a panorama 
of the financial activities of the F ARC. Results show that today their most profitable 
104 Weekly magazine Semana, I 531 of july 7, 1992, p. 26-32. 
10
" The financial data presented is based on the information given by the weekly magazine 
Semana, I 531, July 7, 1992. (amounts are not officially confirmed ). The data was converted from 
Colombian pesos to US dollars, using the rate of USS 1 ,00 = $800 pesos. 
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activity is a kind of tax imposed on cocaine producers. The sources for that information 
are former guerrilla members, and documents accounting the money sent to the 
"secretariado" (central command). Averaging $3 million dollars per each of the eight 
areas of cocaine production in 1991, this totals $24 million dollars. According to those 
documents captured from the F ARC, the fronts or regional groups can keep 60% of the 
collected amounts for their own support. If that information is correct, the total income 
may be close to $60 million dollars. There is not enough information about the 
production of heroin to make a similar calculation. However, it is clear that this business 
is growing very fast and, according to anti-narcotics authorities, the amount could be near 
one third of the total cocaine production, or $20 million dollars. What is almost certain is 
that drug related business represents about 70% ofF ARC income, this is why,to combat 
this problem, the government is attacking drug production centers, that represent the heart 
of the group's finances. 
A third source of finance is kidnapping. The authorities, based on an average 
of rescue payments, estimate that the average income from kidnapping is about $50,000 
dollars per person. In 1991, guerrillas kidnapped 1,580 people, and it has been confirmed 
that 370 of these kidnappings were made by the FARC. The total income from 
kidnapping that year was therefore approximately $18.5 million dollars. Another source 
that today is diminishing is the extortion of cattle ranchers. Based on the available data, 
the authorities estimate an income of$7.5 million dollars in 1991. 
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Other sources of revenue which are less known include gold mining and 
intermediate entrepreneurial enterprise. In 1989, the mining ministry calculated that from 
the $300 million dollars worth of gold mined in the country, the guerrillas took 7%. 
Approximately $21 million dollars worth of gold was taken by the guerrillas. The F ARC 
took a third of that amount, which is $7 million dollars. Finally, the extortion of 
medium-size entrepreneurs and industrialists produced approximately $6.2 million dollars 
in 1991. 
The total revenue for 1991 was therefore approximately $119.2 million 
dollars. Based on the calculations found an intercepted document called "The Strategic 
Plan" of the guerrillas for 1992, the central command was expecting for 1992 an 
incredible increase of 20% in the income of the organization (see summ~ry of data of 
F ARC in Table VII). 
d. ELN's Budget 
The organization of the ELN is less centralized and at the same time less 
complicated than that of the FARC. However, because this organization is more involved 
with the formal and legal economy, the damage is much greater. By the mid-1980s, few, 
but considerably large, extortions were made to oil companies and contractors (around 
$80 million dollars during the construction of the pipeline between Cafto Limon and 
Coveiias). This was enough to resuscitate this movement, which for that time had only 
400 combatants in its organization. The ELN confronts authority less, and is present in 
fewer departments, but without any doubt it is more efficient, because with a third of the 
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combatants (in 1991- 2,000 compared with 6,000 of the FARC), they obtain more than 
half the resources of the FARC. 
Kidnapping is the ELN's principal source of income. Their targeted groups 
include not only cattle ranchers, but industrialists and multinational executives. The 
average ransom paid to the ELN was approximately $75,000 dollars (50% more than the 
average paid to the F ARC). The authorities confirmed that this organization made more 
than 240 kidnappings in 1991, meaning approximately $18 million dollars in ransom. 
However, on a diskette containing financial information that was intercepted in 
Bucaramanga, in some important kidnappings, the rate of profit is higher, such as the case 
of the daughter of Senator Forero Fetecua, when the ELN were paid $3 million dollars. 
Regarding the theft of gold, the calculations of the mining ministry consider 
that the ELN could make about $14 million dollars, because they are twice as active in 
gold producing regions as the F ARC. Paralleling the kidnappings in the petroleum areas 
of Arauca, the ELN had perfected the mechanisms to extort contractors of public works 
projects in that department. Because they have permanent access to information 
regarding the government's budget, they know the availability of resources to the 
contractors. Almost none of the contractors can escape the actions of the ELN, and each 
pays an average of 15% of their contract's value to avoid being targeted for sabotage. 
Government contracts totaled US$56 million in 1991, so it can be deduced that they 
received approximately US$8.5 million. 
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Other fonns of extortion add another US$2 million. Colombian government 
infonnation also reveals that some mayors and government officials, pressured by the 
ELN, paid the group approximately US$8 million of government funds. Extortion of coal 
producers results in an estimated US$1 0 million more. Intelligence reports also maintain 
that the ELN is managing some transportation enterprises (land and rivers) which could 
produce around US$3 million. All of the mentioned amounts yield a grand total of 
US$63.5 million (see summarized data of the ELN in Table VII). 
TABLE VII. SUMMARIZED DATA OF GUERRILLA INCOME'06 
FARCINCOME ELN INCOME 
US$ millions US$ millions 
Kidnappings 18.5 Kidnappings 18 
Extortion to cattlers 7.5 Gold production 14 
Gold Production 7 Extortion contractors 8.5 
Cocaine 60 Extortion others 2 
Heroin 20 government resources 8 
others 6.2 coal 10 
transportation enterprises 3 
TOTAL 119.2 TOTAL 63.5 
Another important fact that these amounts disclose is that the revenues of the 
FARC and ELN, combine to locate the guerrilla groups among the 15 biggest enterprises 
in the country. Individually, the FARC could be number 23 and the ELN number 45. 
The amounts are larger still if one takes into account that the expenses of the guerrillas 
are much less than those of legal companies. For example, the estimated cost per 
combatant of the F ARC is approximately US$900 a year, including health-care, food, 
clothing, and ammunition plus bonuses for especial occasions. Multiplying this amount 
106 Ibid. 
113 
to reflect a membership of6,000, yields only US$5.4 million. ELN guerrillas live a little 
better. Each member costs the organization US$1,250 annually, yielding a total expense 
ofUS$2.5 million. 
The balance funds is a huge amount (US$ 113.8 million for the FARC and 
US$61 million for the ELN). The government maintains that the guerrillas invest no 
more than US$6.5 millions a year in weapons, meaning that the remainder is used for two 
purposes: growth and investment. The government suspects that the groups are already 
investing that money in foreign countries. 
E. THE COST OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
1. General Costs 
The guerrilla actions are very expensive to the country -- in both human and 
economic tenns. During 1991, more than 3,300 people died as a consequence of political 
violence (see Table VIII). Since 1967, the conflict has taken 25,000 lives, and in the 
period 1980-1990, the guerrillas made 2,13 7 kidnappings that were known to the 
authorities. 107 
The economic costs are also enonnous. The attacks against pipelines, increased 
military expenses (the so called economy of war because of the tax increases to 
companies affected by the guerrilla), kidnapping ransoms, attacks against the electric 
utility infrastructure, extortion, etc .. , were estimated to be US$331.2 million in 1991 
-----------------
107 Data taken from a study of the Colombian Institute of Political Sciences, presented in an 
article by Rodrigo Losada in El Tiempo, November 8, 1992, p. 38. 
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(around 1% of the GNP-- see Table IX). This amount is lower than the reality, because it 
doesn't take into account other losses, such as those affecting industrial and agricultural 
production, attacks on towns, ecological damage, etc .. ,(see Table X). Even though this 
economic loss is extremely high, it has not been enough to create instability in the 
economy, but of course things could be better without this burden. 
TABLE VIII'. DEATHS RELATED WITH THE GUERRILLA CONFLICT 
Year Members of the Civilians Guerrilla 
Armed Forces 
1967-1971 180 538 * 
1972-1976 129 219 * 
19n-1981 202 428 * 
1982-1986 832 2,411 2,151 
1987-1991 1,901 2,315 3,113 
Total 
* This amount is believed to be included in civilians 
** Not available data 









TABLE IX'. ECONOMIC COSTS CAUSED BY POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
(Approximated Data) 
Attacks to pipelines 
Military Operations 
Attacks to the electric system 
Kidnappings, extortion* 
Total 
Costs for public sector 
Cost for public sector 
*Costs included in Table VII except drug related revenues 
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TABLE X1• ECONOMIC COSTS NOT INCLUDED 
Diminishing of agricultural production 
Diminishing of industrial production 
Rescues for kidnappings not reported to authorities 
Destroyed commercial and public vehicles 
Destroyed bridges and roads 
Material losses for attacks to towns 
Damage to the environment for oil spills 
Destroyed industrial and commercial installations 
Foreign and national investment not made 
Source : Institute of Politic Sciences, Colombia 
... l .¥ 
In 1993, the studies included new data relating to the cost of the confrontation. 
The Health Ministry estimated the violent deaths for 1992 at 27,500108 -- .the data 
included killings resulting from everything from family abuse to drug related deaths. The 
average age of the victim was 23 years. If we consider that each of those persons could 
work 40 years more, producing at least US$56,000 -- based on the average income of the 
Colombian population -- it is evident that the country is loosing in deaths what it is 
gaining in development. The destruction of human capital in 1992 amounted to 3. 7% of 
the GNP (see Table 2.1 ). At least 10% of these deaths are believed to have been caused 
by the guerrilla confrontation -- human capital destroyed by the guerrillas is worth, in 
economic terms, US$154 million in 1992 alone. But the expenses caused by the violence 
do not end there. The state spends an annual US$84 million on health care related to 
------------------------------- ------------------




violence. 109 Assuming again that 100/o is caused by guerrilla activity, the cost is US$8.4 
millions. 
In general, the guerrilla has affected, either directly or indirectly, most of the 
components of the nation economy. It is almost impossible to determine the real cost of 
this phenomenon, however, because it has been influencing the economy directly for 
more than a decade and there is not enough data. What is certain is that without this 
violence, the country could invest that money in the social reforms and other forms of 
progress that the guerrillas claim are necessary. 
2. Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment in the country for 1988 is presented in Table Xl110• 
TABLE XI. FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT (1988) ORIGIN OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
(1988) 
US$ Millions % Distribution 
Petroleum 274 United States 35.2 
Manufacturing 111.7 Japan 2.8 
Mining (other than petroleum) 17.4 Great Britain 16.8 
Agriculture and fishing 5.9 West Germany 14.5 
Wholesale & retail trade 4.6 Holland 3 
Other sectors 50.4 Panama 2.6 
Total 464 Spain 5 
Others 20.1 
Total 100 
109 Data of the Colombian Ministry of Health, presented in the El Tiempo, October 10, 1993, p. 
2A. 
110 National Department of Planning (ONP), published by the Colombian Information Service, 
Colombian Embassy, Washington, 1992. 
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The effects of the guerrillas on the foreign investment are varied. 111 For 
example, some companies are reluctant to send advanced equipment into a risky 
environment, causing costs due to disadvantaged locations and inefficient production. In 
addition, the adverse effects of that violence generate an economic crisis in the country by 
reducing the profitability of business. 
Despite the difficult conditions under which some of those investments operate, 
there is little inclination on the part of the business to pull out their investments as a result 
of the terrorist threats and attacks. According to the Rand Corporation, foreign 
businessmen approach the problem somewhat philosophically, pointing out that 
businesses cope with terrorism just as they survive war and other types of violence. 
Moreover, businessmen are optimistic about the outcome of the activity in Colombia. 
Although terrorists may harass and attack business, only rarely do they try to damage the 
operation itself, in part because they don't want to alienate local labor, or loose a source 
of income. 
The guerrillas attack foreign businesses for a number of reasons. First, because 
they want to promote an ideology that blames capitalism and foreign investment, and 
accuses foreigners of stealing national resources. Secondly, they wish to obtain 
international publicity that could embarrass the incumbent government. But what 
investors consider more important is the desire of the guerrilla to obtain financial 
resources through extortion and kidnapping. 
··---·- ----------------- ------
111 RAND Corporation, Study R-2842-00C -- "Problems of US Business Operating Abroad in 
Terrorist Environments", pp. 1-29. 
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To cope with the specific threats, many large firms have developed 
corporation-wide security programs that include provisions for executive protection, 
security of employees and facilities, intelligence gathering and analysis, and crisis 
management. The business that are presently operating in Colombia have been 
successful in letting the guerriHclS know that they have a finn position and won't pay 
extortion. 112 This is in part because they know that once they pay a demand, the guerrilla 
won't stop asking for money. The situation is different with foreign companies on 
temporary contracts. Is known that the "Mannesman" was paying high amounts of 
money to the guerrillas while they were working in the country, but still this is a rare 
situation. 
For the foreign companies Colombia is a new market. It is true that the overall 
costs of guerrilla terrorism increase expenses of the companies. This is why the level of 
foreign investment is low in Colombia. With a safer environment, and taking into 
account the economic stability of the country, the foreign investment could be bigger, and 
economic growth could be much higher. 
·- --. ---------------
••z Interview of the Commanding General of the Military Forces, General Ram6n Emilio Gil, in 
El Tiempo, September 19, 1993, p. 20A. 
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V. TOWARD ENDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
A. FIRST RECOMPOSITION STRATEGIES 
On February 27, 1980, the guerrilla movement M-19 assaulted the embassy of the 
Dominican Republic in Bogota. The negotiations to end the guerrilla occupation of the 
embassy, were the prelude to a decade of peace talks between the government and the 
armed movements. In 1982, with the arrival of President Belisario Betancourt, the 
country observed a drastic change in the traditional treatment of the guerrilla problem. 
Positive signs in the beginning of this administration were: the official recognition of the 
"objective and subjective" internal causes of the violence, negotiations, agreements with 
the guerrilla groups, the political opening of the regime, and the National Rehabilitation 
Plan (PNR) for areas affected by violence. 
The dynamic of this process allowed in 1984 the signing of cease-fire agreements 
with three of the biggest guerrilla groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), the 19 of April Movement (M-19), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). 
However, non-compliance with agreements on the part of both parties, successive 
ruptures of the cease-fire, lack of social and economic reforms, parliamentary blocking, 
military opposition against perceived excessive permissivity, and economic crisis were 
the obstacles that very soon created a deep sense of frustration. The President did not 
find adequate support for his project, and at the end of the period there was a poor 
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balance in tenns of peace. The ELN, which had never participated in the peace process, 
was again joined by the rest of the guerrilla groups; the cease-fire was declared broken, 
and the groups supported an initiative of guerrilla union called the National Guerrilla 
Coordinator (CNG). This process helped to militarily strengthen the groups, and even 
generate new movements, such as the Indians' Quintin Lame, Free Homeland (Patria 
Libre ), and the Revolutionary Party of the Workers. 
The internal conflict was again present, though more pervasive than before, but the 
phenomenon was perceived differently by the public than in the past. In 1985, the bloody 
assault on the Palace of Justice (the location of the Colombian Supreme Court), and a 
widespread massacres made by the front "Ricardo Franco" (dissidents in the F ARC), 
clearly decreased the legitimacy of the guerrilla movements as a political alternative. 
However, there was a lesson learned: a negotiated solution to the conflict was possible, 
but would require a parallel transfonnation of the country's institutions. 
This was a lesson that the next administration ( 1986-1990) recognized too late. 113 
In an effort to differentiate itself from the last government, the administration of President 
Virgilio Barco designed a new strategy for peace. His government tried to make refonn 
alone the effort for recovering legitimacy and reducing the influence of the guerrilla. The 
National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) was a key part of the new peace strategy. The plan 
conceived the relocation of public expenditures not only to the areas affected by violence, 
but also in areas that were economically marginal. The coverage of the program grew 
111 Bejarano, Ana Maria, "Estrategias de Paz y Apertura DemocrAtica" in AI Filo del Caos, 
Buitrago, Francisco, ed., Bogota, 1991, p. 59. 
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from 177 towns in 1986 to 297 towns and S million people in 1988.114 The resources 
targeted for this plan were doubled, and the people in affected areas were involved in the 
decision making processes. 
In 1988, guerrilla violence was still a national phenomenon, somewhat accelerated 
by the activities of extreme right-wing groups supported by narcotics-traffickers. The 
president recognized the necessity of constitutional reform, but he was limited by the 
opposition of the traditional parties and the State Council. After two years the peace plan 
was very close to failure. In May 1988 the kidnapping of the political leader Alvaro 
Gomez by the M-19, was an attempt to force a national dialogue. This time the group 
used a different attitude, and offered unilateral cease-fire. It is true that the group was 
militarily weak, but they were capable of terrorist action. In spite of this, they choose the 
political solution. The government then recognized the necessity of a change in strategy, 
and began a dialogue with the group. That is how conversations turned to peace. In the 
beginning of the 1990s, facing the possibility of a profound change through constitutional 
reform, the M-19, the EPL, and other newly formed guerrilla groups decided to 
definitively reincorporate in legal political life. Only the F ARC and the ELN decided to 
remain outside this process. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
A great majority of Colombians felt that reforming the Constitution of 1886 was 
necessary to profoundly transform institutions. On several occasions, the old political 
- ---------------------------------
114 lnforme Financiero Contra/aria General de Ia Republica, June, 1988. 
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country or Judicial instances, denied the possibility of a plebiscite to ask the Colombians 
about the subject. Finally, on May 27, 1990, and, in spite of the fact that the Supreme 
Court had held that there was no provision in the constitution for a referendum, the 
Colombian people expressed their choice in the presidential elections, voting by a great 
majority to modify the constitution. There was nothing to be done; this was the will of 
the people, and the enemies of change finally had to accept it. The Supreme Court 
declared Decree 1926 of 1990 constitutional. This act formalized the legal aspects to the 
new constitution, and did not restrict the ability of the National Constitutional Assembly 
to deal with relevant issues. In the elections of December 9, 1990, the people elected a 
highly representative Constitutional Assembly, with members of all parties, including 
Indians and former guerrilla members. 
The basic reforms in the new constitution were oriented toward the following 
subjects: 11 s 
1. Legitimacy of the State 
The principal idea was to strengthen the legitimacy of the State as a participative 
democracy. Some of the reasons that made this reform necess;uy were: the political 
marginality of large groups of the population, the feeling that there was a lack of social 
and political representation, and the loss of trust in the basic institutions of the state. This 
lack of legitimacy also affected the political parties, and to some degree the groups 
representing private interests. 
-------~~----~-----~-------
115 Reflections on a New Constitution, document prepared by the Government of Cesar Gaviria 
Trujillo, November 1990, pp. 3-28. 
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To strengthen legitimacy, it was necessary to change from a representative 
democracy to a participative democracy. This aspect included more than the creation of 
mechanisms of direct democracy such as the plebiscite, the popular initiative, and the 
revocation of the presidential mandate. Reform also included citizen participation in 
non-electoral scenarios. For example, the people now had more opportunity to create and 
participate in political parties, industrial groups, Unions, their community, and public 
administration. 
2. The Bill of Rights 
The constitution of 1886 was timid in defining civil and political rights and the 
mechanisms to support individual and collective rights. The new constitution increased 
the power in deciding issues that may affect them, and recognized new rights and 
effective mechanisms to protect them. Because the insurgency groups were allowed to 
participate in the reform process, they included in the constitution some of the reforms 
they believed necessary to increase social justice. To develop clear limits to official 
authority, new jurisdictional resources were created, including a Constitutional Court, a 
group that is independent from the Supreme Court, and designed to be more flexible and 
adaptable to changes over time. 
Another purpose was to prot~·c~ individuals from the excesses of authority, and 
to guarantee the rights of minorities. i1 place~ great importance on freedom of religion 
and related education, labor rights, economic security and independence issues, and 
cultural and social rights; ail of them necessary for social justice. It treats health and 
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education as a right and not a privilege, that must be defended by the state and respect by 
the people. The children get their own rights mentioned and protected above all. The 
environmental protection is treated as a right of the community. Mechanism to guarantee 
the comply of this rights and all the rights are giving to the state, to avoid that good 
intentions only finish in the paper of the constitution. 
3. Strong Institutions 
It is important to give the state the power to face the challenges of the present, 
not only in the fighting against unstabilizing factors, but in relation with economic and 
social development, the modernization of the country, and the progress in general. This 
doesn't mean to concentrate power in the executive branch, this mean a pluralist 
conception where all Colombians can participate. Some of the concrete mechanisms tu 
this achieve this are oriented as follows: 
a. Authentic Representation 
To avoid the separation between the institutions and the citizens the 
following measures were taken: 
• Widening of the electoral system not only to majors but to governors and 
community groups as well. 
• To increase participation of minorities in the congress, as Indians or blacks, some 
of their representatives will have different treatment to allow them to be in the 
congress. 
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• More mechanisms of control to supervise the organization of elections are included, 
to guarantee equality. 
• Institutionalization of political parties to guarantee their independence and also 
their finance. Control of the political campaigns to guarantee the transparency of 
their funding. 
• Guarantee of opposition to those movements not in the government, with access to 
information and communication means of the state. 
• Creation of referendum and popular initiative to propose new laws or reforms to the 
constitution. in the past the congress was the only mechanism to obtain law 
changes. 
b. An Efficient Congress 
Toward the moralization of the legislative function. To strength the congress 
not only its composition and integration were modified, the following changes were also 
made: 
• improve its efficiency in the legislative task, rationalizing the discussion of 
initiatives, and creating clear responsibilities and duties to its members. 
• Moralization, through the creation of an statute of the congressmen, able to give 
more transparency to their actions. 
• Give more authority to the congress to formulate economic and social policies, 
public order maintenance policies , plar.aing and budgeting. 
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c. Stn11gt/le11ing the J11stice System 
The idea is to have more means to stop the culture of violence, and avoid that 
justi~e to be behind reality. The changes included: 
• Autonomy of administration and budgeting for justice organizations. 
• decentralization of justice, and a closer relation with the community. The creation 
of "judges of peace" and "Indian judges" for their communities, allow small 
conflicts to be solved faster without waiting for available time of regular judges, or 
even finishing without solution. 
• Give more instruments to the government to fight against terrorism and political 
violence through the legalization of rewards, punishment negotiation, creation of 
special judges with protected identity, , etc .. 
• Give more participation in justice to the executive branch through the creation of 
the Office of the Attorney General. 
d. The St11te of Siege 
This instrument used in the past to allow the executive branch to promulgate 
special laws, became permanent under the last constitution. Now is divided in Interior 
Commotion or State of Emergency. Both are more gradual, and can be used only for a 
limited amount of time, and under the control of the Constitutional Court. However, it 
still permit the President to emit special laws to protect the state. 
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The modification was necessary to give the Colombians a more stable and 
effiCient public administration, with more degree of flexibility and transparency. 
C. ECONOMIC REFORMS 
In 1990, the President Cesar Gaviria convinced the Colombians that it was 
necessary to finish with the oligopolies protected against the external competition. Since 
that time the government has embarked on a rapid program of economic liberalization 
with the goal of internationalizing Colombia's economy' 16• The program called the 
"Apertura" (opening}, is in the present a comprehensive five-year plan of economic and 
trade reforms designed to remove legal restrictions impeding foreign investment and 
private enterprise, and to spur economic development and higher growth. Foreign 
investment regulations and exchange controls have been relaxed. Major areas of the 
economy -- including banks, telecommunications, public utilities, ports, and 
transportation -- are being privatized to reduce the role of government and strengthen 
Colombian private sector. 
The administration strongly promote export development as the key of long-term 
sustained growth. Colombia will benefit from increased oil revenues, due to the recent 
Cusiana field discovery (the largest in the western Hemisphere since Prudhoe Bay was 
discovered in Alaska). Oil exports, in 1991 were 200,000 bpd, and are expected to 
increase to 500,000 bpd by 1995, with the new discoveries still not in full capacity .. In 
·- --···-------------------·-----
116 Colombian Economic Facts, Colombian Embassy, Washington DC, 1992. 
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addition coffee exports will remain strong due to the new policies of the Coffee Growers 
Federation, that decided to sell at a price higher than the world price to compensate for 
the highest quality of the Colombian coffee. After several years without agreement in 
world prices and quotas, the price of coffee dropped to one of the lowest levels in history. 
However, the new strategy of the Colombian Coffee Federation is giving excellent 
results, and the price in the present is increasing. 
Coal production is also expected to increase substantially. Exports in 
non-traditional industries -- cut flowers, textiles, apparel and leather goods, chemicals and 
food I beverage products -- are becoming increasingly important components of 
Colombia's economy. As part of the government commitment to free trade, import tariffs 
for all raw materials and intermediate goods have been eliminated. The Gaviria 
administration has also initiated a micro-enterprise development program, designed to 
provide training, financial assistance and export development support for 1.2 million 
micro-enterprises (private companies with less than ten employees). 
Foreign investment is also growing. 117 Coal is attracting new investors and besides 
the Exxon and other American companies, enterprises as Drummon Ltd, an Alabama oil 
company plan to invest US $50 million to built a private port in the Caribbean coast. 
From 1990 through last year, investment in coal projects more than doubled to US$ 475 
million; this year, foreign investment in that sector is expected to double to US$ I billion. 
In the oil sector, foreign companies plan to also double investment rates, spending US$ 
117 Brooke, James, "Colombia Booms Despite its Violence," New York Times, February 1 0, 
1994. 
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5.5 billion through the end of the decade to develop Cusiana. Even though the foreign 
investment growth is very high compared with the data of 1988 (see chapter 4- Foreign 
investment), the political violence is still costing several growth points. According with 
Colombia's Finance Minister Rudolf Homes, he estimate that without the killings and 
kidnappings by guerrillas, foreign investment in Colombia could be 25% higher. 
Last year, the country recorded 5% growth, slightly above a 20 year average of 
4.4%. Inflation maintained a four-year decline, hitting 23%, half the level of neighboring 
Venezuela. Flush with US$ 8 billion in reserves, Colombia is trimming its foreign debt. 
Last year Colombia prepaid US$ 450 million in public sector foreign debt, reducing the 
debt to its current level of US$ 13.8 billion (one of the lowest in Latin America). After 
signing free trade pacts with virtually all the Andean nations, Colombia now plans to sign 
pacts this year with the common markets of Central America and the Caribbean, and 
formalize its pact with Mexico and Venezuela. 
Although Colombia's macroeconomic indicators look good, not all boats are rising. 
In the last months, the government has recognized some problems in the process and had 
made some adjustments; for example imports of textiles and chicken had been restricted 
to protect national producers from dumping. The revaluation of the peso has been 
another problem, and is taking out dynamism to the export sector and increasing the 
imports, creating the possibility of negative balances. This is due to the high amount of 
capital that had enter in the country since 1990. However, these problems were expected, 
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based on similar experiences of countries like Chile which initiated this process before 
than Colombia, and today has its economy stable and growing. 
A problem that is still present is the number of people living below the poverty line. 
This amount has increased by about one million since 1990, to include about half the 
population of 33 million people. In 1 5 years, the gap between average rural and urban 
incomes doubled. The distance between rich and poor is also increasing. However, the 
present policies don't justify the violence of the guerrillas, because an stable and strong 
economy increase the possibilities of social solutions. The government is aware of 
problems and is acting to close the present gaps. The violence instead of helping, delay 
the process. 
D. SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
The new constitution guarantee the distribution of wealth. However, this is a slow 
process. Some of the concrete actions that the government is planning to take, include a 
Plan ~-! Social Investment with a budget of US$ 6 billion118 that will be used in the 
following areas: 
Ill 
• Reducing the number of persons living in conditions of poverty. Increase support 
will be given to primary and secondary education, health services in rural areas, 
improve drinking water and sewer system capabilities, and construction of 600,000 
new homes. 
Colombian Political Facts, Colombian Embassy, Washington DC, 1991. 
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• Constructing physical infrastructure, including new roads and highways, restoring a 
national rail system and modernizing Colombian ports. 
• Increase investment in science and technology and environmental protection. 
• During the Gaviria government the National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR) increased 
coverage to 450 towns which equal25% ofthe population. 119 
• For 1994 were assigned US$ 38 millions for social security, and the law regulating 
this sector was modified. 
E. NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES 
According with the government, from the 340 towns with the highest rates of 
homicide, in 187 are guerrilla groups, in 7 operate extreme right groups, and in 45 both 
kind of groups are simultaneously. This is the reason why the guerrilla issue was 
included in a plan called "Security for the People" developed by the government in 
November 1993.120 The plan is directed toward all the forms of violence and actions 
against the law. The measures related with the guerrilla are the following. 
1. Administrative Measures121 
To avoid that the guerrilla in areas as Arauca continue using money that belong 
to the state, and using the agrarian reform to their own benefit, the government 
established some control measures. All money allocations to that areas will be closely 
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Article in Semana, I 604, Bogota, November 1993. 
National Strategy Against the Violence, Presidency of Colombia, November 1993. 
Semana. Edition I 550, Bogota, November 17,1992, pp. 32-36. 
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The management of Incora (Colombian Institute for the Agrarian Reform) was also 
centralized for that area, to control the land assignment in areas of guerrilla influence. 
This decision was designed to avoid that the regional agencies of the Incora continue 
assigning lands near the pipelines and oil wells, to guerrilla collaborators. The measures 
goes against the decentralization policies, but due to the special characteristic of the 
problem, they are necessary to cut this finance mean of the guerrilla. 
2. Judicial Measures 
In coordination with the office of the Attorney General, functions of judicial 
police were assigned to the armed forces in some areas of the country. The level of the 
war make necessary that the evidences collected by the authorities, the analysis, death 
removals, etc.. have judicial validity. Other measure is the new anti-kidnapping law, 
which increase punishment for kidnapping until 60 years, and condemn the payment of 
rescues in money, or intervention in the negotiations with kidnappers. 
3. Other measures against Guerrilla Finance 
This measures are pointed toward the organization that take care of the finances 
of the guerrilla. The office of the Attorney General will have power to intervene bank 
accounts or organizations where the government determine that the money of the guerrilla 
is present. 
4. MUitary Measures 
The government and the public opinion are very pessimistic to finish this 
conflict in a pacific way. The guemUa attitude is against the will of the majority of 
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Colombians. The fact of not being part of the transfonnation of the country, convinced 
the people that this is no longer an organization with political intentions, but a crime 
enterprise. Then, to strength the military Forces and be successful in the fight against 
these groups, the government developed the following investment plans. 
• The Police Force will be increased in 25 thousand, to consolidate a force of 114 
thousand members in 1997. Special emphasis will be given to the rural police, 
which wiU be increased in 8,500 members. 
• For the Military Forces, the government will increase the number of professional 
soldiers. These are soldiers chosen from the best regular soldiers, that after 
finishing their compulsory period voluntarily decide to continue in the force. Their 
salary are much better and their food and supplies are covered by the Military 
Forces. The goal for 1995 is to increase this soldiers by 10,000 (additional to the 
23,000 joined in 1993), to make new Mobil brigades. For the year 2000, the 30% 
of the Colombian Anny is expected to be professional soldiers, able to keep peace 
and defend the sovereignty and public order, because they are more prepared and 
are in the military forces by their own will. 
• The system of Mobil Brigades created in 1989 will continue to be increasing. The 
advantage of this Brigades is that in persecution of guerrillas, they can operate in 
different areas without asking permission to the military authorities of that area. 
Another advantage is the possibility of accumulate experience and knowledge 
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persecuting the same group by several months. The plan is to create one Mobil 
Brigade for each of the five big areas in which the country is militarily divided. 
• There will be more investment in the mobilization capacity. Particularly in the area 
of helicopters, and patrols in maritime and river areas. The money to acquire new 
elements will be given, but also the maintenance resources for these equipment will 
be increased. The communication and electronic systems will be modernized. 
• The government will continue its policy to improve salary and welfare of the 
militaries. When the process is finished, the increment is expected to be a real 40% 
compared with the income in 1991. In 1992 the government assigned US$ 25 
millions for this program, and in four years is expected to cost approximately US$ 
381 millions. 
• The Intelligence organizations will be strengthen. One priority will be the increase 
of their budget to get better information, and increase the coordination between the 
different organizations with that mission within the Armed Forces and the 
government. The Superior Council for Defense and National Security, will create 
mechanisms of analysis of intelligence information, to facilitate decision making 
for the government. 
• The deserter program is other measure. In areas of combat, the commands are able 
to pay until $500 thousand pesos to deserters which resign to the guerrilla and give 
information. If the guerrilla give his or her gun, will receive extra $1 00 thousand 
pesos. If the information is useful to capture the leader of the front, the reward 
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increase to $1 million pesos. More than 600 deserters have used this program, and 
several front leaders are now in jail. 
• The allocation of money for the Military Forces is now faster. The government is 
convinced that delays in money for fuel or intelligence purpose, can cause great 
damage in operations that need continuity as a base for success. The expenditures 
for the public force will be increased from 2.8% of the GNP in 1993, to 4% in the 
next 10 years. Part of this belong to salary increases. 
• The possibilities of negotiations remain open if the guerrilla organization prove its 
will of peace. In April 1994, a new movement of 500 guerrillas join legal political 
life. This is the group of the Socialist Renovation Current (a dissident of the ELN). 
What seems to be clear for the government of the president Gaviria, is that the 
investment in Defense for the internal problem is necessary. With a strong military 
forces, able to hardly hit the guerrilla, is possible to convince their members that the 
negotiation is more guarantee to their future than the continuation of their business. Is 
necessary to keep the public opinion in our side. The success in operations is clearly 
supported, but the opinion is very easy to change as was proved whit the terrorist attacks 
of the Medellin cartel, which found echo of negotiation and dialogue. The public weaken 
when they feel that the war will touch them hard. In recent opinion polls 122, the 
Colombian had expressed the following: 
122 Yankelovich Colombia: Research and Consulting, (Margin error 3.5%) reported in Semana, 
1540, Bogota, June 2 1992. 
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• 60.8% of the Colombians think that military forces must take the initiative and use 
all their methods to combat the guerrilla. 7.3% disagree and 31.9% don't know. 
• 60.2% of the Colombian think that the guerrilla is the biggest enemy of the country. 
25.8% Narcotics-trafficking, 6.6% none, 7.4% don't know. 
• Other opinion poll 123 shows that 64% of the population support the measures 
against the guerrilla taken by the government. 23% are against and 13% don't 
know. 
It is desirable for the near end of this war that this policy continue in the future, 
parallel with the social and political reforms. The results already support this hypothesis 
because the military actions are beginning to give results. In December 1993 the 
President presented the following results for that year: 124 
• 3,115 guerrillas were captured, 30 ofthem were leaders. 
• The kidnappings has decreased 40% compared with 1992 (this is also due to the 
law reforms). 
• The assaults to pipelines also is lower than in 1992. 
'll lnvamer Gallup, reported in Semana, 1550, Bogota, November 1992, p. 36. 
124 Discurso del Presidente Gaviria en Ceremonia Ascenso Generales, El Tiempo, December 
10, 1993, Judicial Section. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Manual Marulanda Velez is still in the mountains. He is now 66 years old, and he 
has been an active guerrilla for half a century. It is clear that he will never see his 
revolutionary vision of Colombia fulfilled. There is a distinct possibility that he may 
have admitted this to himself; his survival as a guerrilla indicates a necessary level of 
intelligence. Whether his continued belief in violent revolution is criminal or not is for 
the judiciary to determine, but continued violent action is clearly illegal, and the majority 
of Colombia's institutional and societal stakeholders have expressed a willingness to end 
it. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This, then, may be the most simple and direct conclusion to be offered: Colombia 
as a nation Is prepared to end political violence. Beyond the willingness to end 
political violence, however, is agreement on the means through which this is to be 
accomplished. The constitutional reform and national dialog approach that has emerged 
in the early 1990s is expected to maintain wide-spread support for the foreseeable future. 
Inherent to this approach, however, is the willingness to maintain the increased cost and 
decreased benefit to those who would participate in political violence. 
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La Violencia marked the passionate nature of Colombian political life at its violent 
extreme. Approximately 200,000 lives were lost, as well as a substantial percentage of 
the nation's infrastructure, and migration to the cities made lasting changes in the 
distribution of the population. The emotive bonds to Colombia's Liberal and 
Conservative Parties were traditional to the point where they often flowed through 
bloodlines, and for several years these bonds drew supporters beyond the polls and into 
violent conflict with adherents of the opposition. 
This war was more a fight for power than a struggle to find a better way of life for 
Colombians, and by the time it was finally brought under control, things had not changed 
very much. Despite the fact that the traditional parties had reached an agreement, 
motivations powerful enough to drive violence in pursuit of political objectives were still 
present. National institutions continued to be weak, creating an obstacle that impeded 
access to political rights and the development of social justice. This was not Gaitan's 
vision of the modem Colombia, and the "Revolution on the March" did not deliver the 
social reforms that it promised. Once again, people took up arms, formed guerrilla 
groups, and vowed to seek a political change through violent means. More recently, the 
rise of right-wing groups illustrated a perceived need to resort to violence, which is 
paradoxical in a country that weathered the r::3nsequences of the world economy crisis 
with better performance than many others in Latin America. 
This work has sought to answer the question, "What are the causes and 
consequences of guerrilla violence in Colombia?" 
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1. Causes 
While the research allows causes of guerrilla violence to be discussed, it by no 
means generates a comprehensive list of specific causes. What can be said, however, is 
that the root causes of guerrilla violence in Colobia lie in three principal categories: 
social, political, and economic. Further, problems in each of these categories seem to 
center on the social, political, and economic institutions involved. 
The social dimension is characterized by the weakness of the state institutions, 
and the absence of true refonn over the years. As the nation modernizes, these 
institutions, which nonnally function to ease societal conflict as it arises, have failed to 
maintain an arena for effectively resolving issues. This has frequently caused the 
political regime to lose its legitimacy. 
The political contribution to guerrilla violence is significant throughout the 
nation's history. It is particularly acute, however, when considering the period of the 
National Front, which according to some analysts represented a reconfinnation of 
political power in the traditional elites, limiting the democratic participation of other 
forces, practically prohibiting legal opposition, and institutionalizing the clientelism. 
There are, however, several facts which lead away from accepting political 
reasons as the cause of continuing guerrilla violence: 
• Political participation was not completely restricted, as evidenced by the existence 
of organizations such as ANAPO and the MRL. 
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• If duopoly contributed to clientelism, it also prevented one party from maintaining 
a monopoly. 
To understand the economic roots of guerrilla violence, a distinction must be 
made between the country's economic performance and the economic incentives of 
violence. 
The macroeconomic performance and the unequal distribution of income in 
Colombia is as good as or better than those of many other countries in Latin America, 
with lower levels of violence and even without guerrilla. The development of the 
economy may have retarded by internal conflicts, but the economy has nonetheless 
developed, and done so independent of election results. Very early in our history, the 
dominant classes maintained economic power, and the common interests of the 
traditional parties, including coffee growers and industry, permitted a healthy 
development of the macroeconomic policies. Today this continues to be true, and the 
economic groups maintain direct access to the formulation of policies, that benefit their 
capitalist interests, sometimes to the detriment of the lower income group. 
It is therefore possible to argue that, economically speaking, incentives play the 
main role in this war. The desire of individuals to maximize their gain is the driving 
force that makes them join the guerrillas. Some people find in violence a good method of 
expressing their desire for resources, and the initial possibility of achieving equality and a 
better distribution of wealth was a good incentive for joining the revolution. In the case 
of the F ARC and the ELN, it is clear that violent insurection has become big business. 
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As noted in Chapter VI, the earnings of the guerrilla groups place them among the most 
profitable economic enterprises in the country, with an annual estimated profit ofUS$175 
million. 
2. Consequences 
The consequences of guerrilla violence in Colombia may likewise be 
categorized as social, political, and economic, and should also be viewed as being 
difficult to definitively and comprehensively identify. In addition to the obvious but no 
less significant cost in human lives, however, there are several impacts of the violence 
which should be enumerated. 
In Chapter VII, economic losses for the country were estimated in US$331.2 
million for 1991, but this amount does not include other costs that are very hard to 
quantify. For example, the costs of lost human lives, the extra costs in health-care, the 
investments that are withheld from the country despite good macroeconomic conditions, 
and the future costs that will arise from not being able to spend more money on social 
development. However, it is also important to notice that, despite this dark panorama, the 
country has learned to grow and progress in even this environment. 
Another consequence is the multiplier effect of guerrilla violence. Because the 
guerrilla groups targeted violence to achieve control over resources and territories rather 
than to advance political ideology, the violence becomes cyclical; guerrilla groups use 
violence to acquire resources from the land owners or entrepreneurs, and some of these 
victims respond violently to protect their interests, because the state's institutions are not 
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considered strong enough, or because of the feeling that the problem cannot be solved in 
a pacific way under any circumstances. The problem is that these groups tend to value 
property rights over human life. In some rural areas, people are eliminated just for being 
suspected of belonging to a leftist l.. :;mization. Union leaders, politicians, and members 
of the media, to name a few, become targets of these groups. The reverse is also true; the 
guerrillas eliminate people whom they think are helping the government. 
3. Prospects for the Future 
In spite of the history of guerrilla violence in Colombia, the 1990s are promising 
to be a decade of long awaited success for the country's institutions. The isolation of the 
various stakeholders in society is coming to an end, and each is entering into a more 
comprehensive dialog with the others. Several key developments are worthy of mention 
in support of such optimism: 
• There has been a societal recognition of dialog and participatory government as the 
means through which to achieve, at last, true progress towards social justice. 
• There has been a rejection of violence as a means of obtaining political objectives, 
and an increase in the use and membership of non-violent institutions and 
movements. 
• Some guerrilla groups are demilitarizing and developing legitimate channels 
through which to advance there agenda. 
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It appears that the traditional motivations of those who pursue the life of a guerrilla 
are being directly addressed by these changes, a hypothesis that is supported by several 
observances: 
• Support for guerrilla groups is decreasing in key rural areas, which have 
traditionally been pillars of guerrilla support. It appears as though the national 
dialog and reconciliation is producing results in winning the participation of rural 
communities. 
• There is a widespread condemnation of the guerrilla agenda, which is increasinly 
viewed by the population at large as a cause of violence and destruction, rather than 
a struggle for peace and prosperity. 
• There is a recognition of the paradoxical nature of guerrilla philosophies and 
practices. While guerrillas "preach" societal progress, the "practice" more often 
produces more material results, such as money or power, for the key individuals 
involved. 
• The cost/benefit analysis which a rational individual is said, by some political 
theorists, to perform in order to make a decision regarding participation in guerrilla 
activity is increasingly yielding a result that favors a more legitimate approach to 
achieving benefit. Once there is more to be gained, at less cost, through dialog 
rather than violence, the rational individual, in this case the rational Colombian, 
will choose to participate in national dialog and reconciliation. 
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• No explanation would be complete without referencing what may be the most 
influential event ofreeent history, the collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be that 
the psychological and sociological impact of this event is even more significant 
than the loss of operational support by the guerrillas. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As shown in Chapter VIII, the majority of Colombians -are against political 
violence, and are not likely to support any guerrilla movement. The guerrillas are aware 
of this situation, and they realize that their war will not result in a rise to power. What 
has continued to make this way of life so attractive is the economic incentives it offers. 
The profits available to individual members continue to be high, but where profit 
potential exists, the government has maintained ample pressure, thereby increasing the 
relative costs as well. There is a lesson to be learned from the past, however. When 
attempts at dialog have led to a general permissivity on the part of the government, the 
guerrillas have had sufficient breathing space to regroup and renew. The best course 
therefore involves a firmness with regard to guerrilla violence that is at least equal to the 
willingness to enter into dialog and reconciliation. The nation will no doubt continue to 
rely on the professionalism and dedication of its military in maintaining the internal 
stability and overall security of the country. 
Continued reform will be necessary, and the dialog should never be discontinued, 
for these are the tools with which Colombia must pursue its continued development. 
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Lasting change will only be possible through a lasting institutions and institutional 
values. 
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Again and again in the research, material was encountered that reflected a 
fascination with violence as a cultural phenomenon in Colombia. While this research 
effort was focused on political violence and its economic consequences, it would be 
appropriate for a study to be made of Colombian violence of all kinds. It would be useful 
to discuss at length whether the level of general violence in the country is greatly 
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